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Long-term care and
ageing populations
In the USA older people are often surprised to discover that although some
of the long-term care services they need are paid for through Medicare, there
are other kinds of care which they must purchase out of their own resources
(including private insurance if they have any) or apply to Medicaid for means-
tested public assistance. The experience of older people in the United Kingdom
is some respects similar, though they may perhaps be less confused about their
entitlements. Some of their long-term care needs will be met by the National
Health Service and paid for out of the NHS budget, so there will be no user
fees. For other needs they will have to apply to their local authority, which
manages the social care budget and provides publicly subsidised care only on
the basis of a means-test. In this case, many people do have to pay user fees,
which can very high if what is needed is residential or institutional care. The
situation in the UK is in fact even more complicated than the comparison with
the USA might suggest – since in some circumstances the kind of care which
is usually provided through the local authority may in other circumstances form
part of a larger care package which is provided by the NHS.
What lies behind these particular administrative boundaries – apart from their
peculiar institutional histories – is the fact that older people who need long-
term care because of a long-standing medical condition or disability usually
have complex care needs. They may have a long-term need for regular medical
care and regular nursing care and regular help with some of the essential activ-
ities of daily living. In their 2005 report on long-term care for older people,
the OECD follows what is, however, standard practice in choosing to define
long-term care services in a way which sets them apart from health care serv-
ices. Long-term care services provide the kind of help that people need when
they are dependent on others for assistance with some of the essential activi-
ties of daily living. The OECD also follows standard practice in distinguishing
between more severely disabled people who need help with ‘personal care’
(e.g. toileting and bathing) and less severely disabled people who need help
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with a range of activities that are necessary for what the Americans call
‘homekeeping’.
The possibility of receiving help with homekeeping activities indicates the
extent to which publicly subsidised long-term services have changed across
the entire developed world over the last thirty years or so: they are no
longer provided only in institutional settings. This shift towards the provi-
sion of long-term care services which enable people to continue to live ‘in
the community’ has also brought with it (besides a whole host of organi-
sational problems) an increased awareness of the importance of what is
now almost universally called ‘informal’ care – long-term care that is
provided usually by family members at home. Not only is it generally
accepted that the bulk of long-term care in developed countries is provided
informally by family members (at no cost to the taxpayer), but it is also
widely accepted that in recent years the burden of care on families has
been growing steadily. Older people with the kinds of care need that would
previously have triggered a move to institutional care are increasingly
being looked after by family members at home.
This issue of Ageing Horizons deals with some of the difficult challenges
that arise in attempting to provide solutions to the policy problems posed
for long-term care services by the interaction between population ageing
and those various changes in the family which limit its capacity to provide
informal care. Although the publication last year of a ground-breaking
review of ‘social care’ services by Derek Wanless has given the issue a
strong UK focus, the innovative methodology of the Wanless review, as
Bleddyn Davies argues in his article, is such that it deserves to have an
influence as well as a readership outside the UK.
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Abstract
What should governments do about the provision of long-
term care for frail elderly people in ageing societies? This
paper considers some of the difficulties of taking a global
view on this matter. It examines differences and similar-
ities in policy context between developing and developed
countries, and asks to what extent and in what way the
problems of policy-making for long-term care are prob-
lems of fairness.
Introduction
What should governments do about the provision of long-
term care for frail elderly people in ageing societies?
Although the question seems straightforward enough, it
does invite us to consider ageing societies en bloc, and this
is perhaps an invitation we should resist, especially if we
are thinking of generalising across both developed and
developing countries. The difficulties of taking a global
view on this matter are the subject of this paper.
In 2003 the World Health Organization published a report
which laid out a ‘conceptual framework’ for the analysis
and development of long term care strategies, and it drew
a firm line between the more industrialized developed world
and the developing world. 
We should emphasize that this analysis rests primarily on
the experience of industrialized countries. The conditions
in the developing world and their initial experience in
developing long-term care systems are quite different.
Thus, not only the resolution of the basic long-term care
design issues, but even the strategy for defining and
analysing those strategies must be different.
Brodsky et al., 2003, p.269
A very similar line is being drawn by the authors of a
discussion of key issues in the design of long-term care
systems when they argue that ‘for reasons both of princi-
ple and practicality, a public, comprehensive, independent
system of long-term care is appropriate in advanced coun-
tries’ (Ikegami and Campbell, 2002, p.22; my italics). It
is not just that different social and economic conditions
might call for different policies, but rather that social and
economic conditions are so different in the developed and
developing world that policies have to be selected from a
quite different set of options with different criteria guiding
the choice between them. Even if we insist on the essen-
tially global nature of the demographic and socio-cultural
trends that are exerting so much of the pressure for change
in existing provisions for the care of the frail elderly both
inside and outside the OECD, there is really little point in
trying to generalise across countries that are as different as,
say, Sri Lanka and Germany. Were we to try to charac-
terise the policy challenge that these pressures create in such
a way that both governments can be seen to confront the
same policy challenge, we would almost certainly come up
with something rather bland and uninteresting – such as
‘how to increase both the quantity and quality of formal
long-term care provision for elderly people’. It is not easy,
in other words, to say anything that would be of much
interest to policy-makers without incorporating some assess-
ment of the magnitude or urgency of this challenge, and of
the way in which it is shaped and framed by an institutional
context. How can we even begin to debate appropriate
policy responses without taking account of the existing state
of formal provision – the service infrastructure – as well
as competing social priorities and the level of resources
available to meet them? 
If, however, we are uncertain about the value of looking
for common ground in the challenges for long-term care
policy in Sri Lanka and Germany, why should we not be
at least cautious about the value of looking for common
ground in the challenges for long-term care policy in, say,
Germany and Sweden? The fact that Germany and Sweden
have more in common than Germany and Sri Lanka is
arguably beside the point if we suppose that policy makers
concerned with long-term care have to resolve challenges
that are shaped by the impact of socio-demographic pres-
sures on highly particularized institutional contexts. What
has to be decided is how to remedy or mitigate the defects
and problems that the pressures of population ageing will
disclose in a specific set of institutional arrangements. We
are assessing the case for doing something differently, for
changing these arrangements, and this case must surely
start from an interpretation of the requirements of the
present situation, and the failings and inadequacies of the
relevant institutions. Perhaps then we should be wary of
making any really useful generalisations about the policy
challenges facing long-term care services even in ageing
societies that share as much as do Germany and Sweden. 
Wary, perhaps, but it is surely wrong to suggest that policy
analysts and researchers in one country would be wasting
their time if they tried to learn something from the policy
successes and failures of other countries. It is not uncom-
mon, for example, for British or American commentators
to make unfavourable comparisons between the public provi-
sion of formal services in their own countries and what is
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available in the Scandinavian countries. Are they entirely
mistaken in supposing that there are lessons to be learnt in
making the judgement that one country is ‘doing better’ in
this respect than another? At the very least these compar-
isons require us to sharpen our formulations of the standards
by which we judge of success and failure in long-term care
policy. And surely it makes sense for the same researchers
to ask about the advantages and disadvantages of different
forms of public subsidy for long-term care (such as the
social insurance systems in Germany or Japan); or the
advantages and disadvantages of different ways of manag-
ing the interface between health care and social care or
social services (see, e.g. Harrington et al., 2002).
Comparisons between countries help to clarify and system-
atize both the range of policy options available to any given
country, and the methods of evaluating them.
In what follows I will sketch a few of the many diagnoses that
have been made in recent papers on the policy challenges of
long-term care in a small selection of OECD countries before
going on to consider, firstly, how these challenges look from
the points of view of an equally small selection of middle-
income countries, and secondly, some of the attempts to
generalise about the key issues that underlie these policy
challenges. It has to be emphasised that the particular diag-
noses that have been selected for inclusion here are not always
uncontroversial, certainly when it comes to the OECD coun-
tries. The point they illustrate is that policy problems and
challenges are framed in terms of what is usually a contestable
diagnosis of the defects and failings of a very specific set of
institutional arrangements. There are often substantial differ-
ences of opinion about the nature of the failings and defects
of the institutional arrangements within any given country,
and furthermore, these arrangements differ considerably
from country to country and have their own particular histo-
ries. What should also be clear is that very different (and often
incompatible) political commitments and principles have
helped to shape these diagnoses – ranging from the free-
market conservatism of the Cato Institute in the USA to
egalitarian social democracy in Sweden.
Diagnosing problems and challenges for long-
term care systems in selected OECD
countries
USA
For several US commentators (Kaplan, 2005; Johnson,
2005; Moses, 2005; Mulvey, 2005) who have written
recently on the theme of long-term care policy the central
problem is a financial one: who is to pay for the additional
formal long-term care (LTC) services that are going to be
required as a result of population ageing? There may indeed
be a problem, in the USA as elsewhere, with both the
quality and appropriateness of care services that are provided
for the most part by the private sector (Eaton, 2005), but
for these particular commentators it is the increasing reliance
of middle-income Americans on Medicaid that underpins the
case for reforming existing arrangements for the provision
of formal LTC services in the USA. Most Americans cannot
readily pay ‘out-of-pocket’ for LTC services, especially
when these services involve placement in a nursing home1;
and only a small minority of Americans take out private
LTC insurance (less than 10 per cent of people aged 55+
in 2002). Medicare, which pays for the medical care of
almost all Americans aged over 65, does not as a general
rule cover the long-term needs for non-medical care that
often arise as a result of chronic disabling illness; and
Medicaid, the health component in the USA’s means-tested
public assistance programmes, pays for the long-term care
only of those people who are judged to be sufficiently poor
to require welfare support.2
The main source of the political pressure for reform is the
fact that the costs of paying for LTC services are making
themselves increasingly felt, both on Medicaid budgets
(CBO, 2004; GAO, 2005) and on the financial resources
of middle-income Americans, most of whom appear to have
no real choice but to ‘spend down’ their own resources until
they become eligible for Medicaid.3 The fact that many
people in these circumstances accelerate their Medicaid
eligibility by what is generally known as ‘Medicaid plan-
ning’ or ‘Medicaid estate planning’ – they transfer their
assets to someone else – complicates the picture, however.
It is not clear (or is anyway open to dispute) whether the
system is resulting in a widespread and catastrophic spend-
down of assets (which is Kaplan’s view), or whether the
manipulation of loopholes in the eligibility rules is so wide-
spread that the programme no longer functions as a safety
net for people who have spent down into impoverishment;
but rather is fast becoming the principal payer of long-term
care fees for everyone except the very well-off (which is
Moses’ view). Either way, an increasing proportion of older
Americans are becoming reliant on what was originally
conceived as a ‘poverty programme’ to pay for their long-
term care, which is not only inappropriate, but seriously
threatens the ability of the programme to do what it is
meant to do. What is not in dispute for these analysts is
that both Medicaid and the market for private LTC insur-
ance should be reformed so that fewer people will be reliant
on Medicaid and more people will take out LTC insurance.
The development of the market for private LTC insurance
is regarded in other words as an essential part of the solu-
tion to the problem of increasing the supply of formal
long-term services.4 The ‘marketplace’ (properly regulated)
will supply the additional formal LTC services required as
a result of population ageing and the declining availability
of informal care; the problem is that most Americans lack
the resources to pay for these services ‘out-of-pocket’, not
that they altogether lack the resources to pay for them. 
Germany
In 1994 the German Parliament passed into law measures
which established a social insurance scheme for long-term
care similar in nature to the country’s existing schemes for
health care, pensions and unemployment. The costs of
providing long-term care services are met, in other words,
by mandatory contributions from both employees and
employers (with children and non-employed married part-
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ners being co-insured at no extra cost)5, and the scheme is
financed furthermore on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis: the costs
of providing benefits to current beneficiaries are to be
covered by current contributions.6 Although the actual
administration of the scheme is in the hands of about 250
separate long-term care insurance funds – affiliated to the
health care insurance funds – contribution rates, eligibility
criteria for benefits and level of benefits themselves are all
fixed by law. Entitlements have been set at levels that very
often require beneficiaries to make quite substantial out-of-
pocket payments to cover the full cost of their care package.
Individuals who are unable to make these supplementary
payments out of their own income do not have the full cost
of their care met from the scheme. The government uses
instead its general tax revenue to make up the difference
with a form of means-tested income support. 
Eligibility for benefits under the insurance scheme is
determined on the basis of an assessment of need which
takes no account of either family or financial circum-
stances. What matters is whether or not individuals
require help in performing basic activities of daily living
as a result of disability. If individuals are judged to need
‘considerable care’ they are entitled to benefits – and if
they need more intensive care, they are entitled to a
higher level of benefits. 
So what’s the problem? It looks as though the introduction of
social LTC insurance in Germany resolved a similar
problem to that which now worries commentators in the
USA: excessive dependence on public welfare assistance to
pay for a kind of care need that was generally excluded from
the provisions of health care insurance. The sharp reduction
in the number of older people in Germany claiming public
assistance to pay for institutional care does indeed suggest
that this problem has been resolved. Public attention and
debate is now focused, however, on the projected rise in
contribution rates that an unreformed system would require
over the next 45 years (Arntz et al., 2007) – with estimates
ranging between about 80% and over 200%. The scheme is in
fact rapidly running down reserves that it built up in its first
few years of operation and is projected to go into deficit
within the kind of time horizon that tends to exercise govern-
ments even more than these long-term projections. It is built
into the very nature of the scheme therefore that something
has to be done in the near future – and the predictability of the
coming demographic shock makes it sensible to consider
how to reform the scheme in such a way as to withstand it.
What makes this an issue so soon after the introduction of a
social insurance scheme is the belief that contribution rates
should not be allowed to rise by the amount that many
analysts think would be required to balance the books. The
worry here lies in the fact that contributions to the scheme are
shared by employee and employer – and there are serious
concerns about the effects on employment of increasing non-
wage costs for employers. As in the USA then, the problem
centres on the incidence of the increasing costs of providing
formal long-term care, but its contours are quite different, not
least because of the degree of public support that exists for a
social insurance scheme (Arntz et al., 2007). The choice
appears to lie between reducing the generosity of scheme – so
that beneficiaries meet even more of the costs of care
through out-of-pocket payments – or reforming its financing
in a way that will allow it to maintain its present match
between care needs and entitlements to publicly subsidized
care.
United Kingdom
In 1996, three years before a government Royal Commission
published its final conclusions on what should be done
about long-term care, the Joseph Rowntree Trust published
its own report advocating the adoption of social (i.e. manda-
tory) insurance for long-term care in the UK. Now, ten
years later, the Trust has revisited the policy challenges of
long-term care in a discussion document (Hirsch, 2005). The
government’s decision not to implement some of the more
controversial recommendations of the Commission left many
issues unresolved, and the Joseph Rowntree Trust is not
alone in thinking that something has to be done – and sooner
rather than later – about the public provision of long-term
care in the UK.7 The Trust’s earlier proposal for a funded
care insurance scheme has been shelved, partly because of
what happened subsequently to equity values in financial
markets and partly because of declining confidence in finan-
cial institutions.8 In its place, we find a discussion which
is more concerned to specify the nature of the policy chal-
lenges than select any particular solution. What matters is
that we understand what we are trying to do in choosing
between the available options. 
The starting point for this discussion is that the over
long-term the UK will not be able to avoid paying more
for long-term care. ‘Doing nothing is not an option.
Sooner or later, we will have to pay for the care that
many of us will need as we grow older’ (Hirsch, 2005,
p.32). ‘The main question is whether we can do so
under a system that is fairer, and seen to be fairer, than
the present arrangements’ (ibid., p.1). There is no crisis
in long-term care at the moment, but if decisions are put
off until a crisis occurs, there is a serious risk that the
necessary changes will be made in messy and inequitable
way. Act now, and it should be possible ‘to make
choices about how to make resources available on a fair
and rational basis’ (ibid., p.32). One of the main condi-
tions of a fair and rational allocation of resources is a
system of provision that strikes the right balance between
what is provided by the State and what is paid for by
individuals or their families out of their own resources
– and this balance, argues the Rowntree report, has to
take proper account of public perceptions of the fairness
and consistency of the institutional structures that treat
different types of care need in different ways. 
The underlying problem for the UK is that we have not
fully made up our mind to what extent long-term care,
like health treatment, should be part of ‘universal’ public
provision or, like housing, be paid for by private indi-
viduals except for those who cannot afford to do so.
Hirsch, 2005, p.11
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In other words, the terms of the problem (and note that the
UK is importantly different from the USA in this respect)
are set by the contrast between the way in which health care
services are provided to those who need them and the way
in which non-health care services are provided to those
with long-term care needs. 
Sweden
Budgetary constraints on the public provision of formal
long-term care are nothing new in Sweden. The level of
targeting and rationing of services has been ratcheted up
considerably since the late 1980s, and it is the use of tax
financing rather than social insurance that has enabled
service providers to focus resources more carefully and
narrowly on those older people whose needs are greatest.
This marks an important contrast with the German system,
which has virtually no room for provider discretion in the
targeting of resources. Since the eligibility criteria for bene-
fits are specified in the law which enacted the social
insurance scheme in the first place, any decision to raise
the threshold at which people are judged to be in need of
care is shifted from the realm of administration to the realm
of politics.
The Swedish home help services that are now more tightly
rationed than were previously are still, however, provided
either free of charge or heavily subsided to those people
who are judged to need them. Although many users do
make some out-of-pocket payments for the care they receive,
they are quite a lot lower than those in Germany (Karlsson
et al., 2007). In other words, the Swedish system is more
generous in the way it matches entitlements to care needs.
Eligibility for publicly-provided long-term care services
depends, however, not only on the presence of need (as in
Germany) but also on the inability to meet these needs ‘by
other means’. What matters for these decisions in Sweden
are not financial means (as in the UK or the USA), but the
availability of close family; and there is a clear expectation
that spouses – though not adult children – should provide
some degree of care, assuming of course that they them-
selves are not prevented from doing so by ill-health or
disability. 
And for the future? There is, according to Mats Thorslund
(2004), considerable public consensus in Sweden about the
importance of the core values and principles which have
characterised the country’s welfare arrangements since the
1950s, and it is this which sets the terms of the policy chal-
lenge for the country’s system of providing formal LTC
services to the frail elderly. Although it seems likely that
the pressures for change will be much less severe in Sweden
than in other parts of Europe – Germany say – they are
nonetheless real enough. The challenge, therefore, is to
adapt arrangements for the provision of formal LTC serv-
ices to changing socio-demographic conditions without
sacrificing values and principles that have been given defi-
nite form by popular institutions. The need for adaptation
only arises of course if we suppose that the volume of
provision cannot be allowed to expand in line with increas-
ing demand – on the grounds that this would place too
great a strain on the already highly-taxed Swedish economy.
If, on the other hand, we quarrel with this supposition, there
is no need to accept the socio-demographic case for cost-
containment, and the ‘adaptations’ it implies. The challenge,
on this view, is not how to adapt formal LTC services to
changing socio-demographic conditions but how to obviate
the need for adaptation – how to ensure that the economy
continues to generate the resources that are required to pay
for the welfare services that the public wants. The country
stands, therefore, at a kind of crossroads: it can choose
either to try and resist the pressures for adaptation or it can
go along with them by providing a service with reduced
ambitions. Thorslund’s view is that the country will choose
the second route – and furthermore that it will do so not
simply in response to economic constraints but also because
of ‘new ideas about the appropriate way forward’ (p.126).
What does this mean in practical terms? The very least it
means is that future cohorts of older people in Sweden will
have to cross a higher need-threshold in order to be enti-
tled to support from public services (Sundström et al.,
2006). For Thorslund, as I have said, the policy challenge
is not so much to avoid this outcome as to reconcile what-
ever ‘adaptations’ are made to the system with the core
values and principles which have so far characterised the
country’s welfare arrangements. Although he does not spell
out exactly what this means, it seems likely that the kind
of problem he has in mind is that of getting the balance
right between more rationing and increased user charges.
How does the government share out the costs of reducing
the ambitions of its publicly subsidised provision?
And from outside the OECD
Detailed analysis of the policy challenges that the provision
of long-term care presents for middle- or low-income coun-
tries is much harder to find than it is for high-income
countries. No doubt there are many reasons why this should
be so. One reason that stands out, however, from the
middle-income country ‘case studies’ compiled by the World
Health Organization in 2003 is that what counts as a distinct
policy challenge in most OECD countries tends be subsumed
under – and not merely overshadowed by – two other
looming social protection issues in most non-OECD coun-
tries: inadequate pension coverage and lack of access to
appropriate health care (Brodsky et al., 2003b). Researchers
in OECD countries frequently make the point that families
are the main source of daily life care for older people who
require help with essential activities as a result of physical
or mental disability. At least part of the rationale for distin-
guishing this particular role as one that the family continues
to fulfil even in the wealthiest of countries is the fact that
it is no longer the main source of other forms of old-age
care and support.9
The lack of availability of appropriate health care provi-
sion for people with chronic disease and disability in many
middle- or low-income countries means that family care-
6
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
givers will usually be the main source of both daily life care
and illness care.10 This is partly because of the sectoral
and/or geographical concentration of health care resources:
and partly because of the high costs that individuals
frequently have to bear in order to purchase the health care
they need. Health care resources are as a rule much more
thinly spread in rural areas than in urban areas, and they
are often very much concentrated on the acute care sector.
In Mexico, for example, about 10% of the population lack
regular access to basic health care facilities; and the publicly
subsidised health care that is received by about 40% of the
population11 is firmly based in the hospital sector. Although
the country is developing home-based or community-based
alternatives to hospital care, it is still very much at the
beginning of this process (Knaul et al., 2003). 
Very substantial proportions of the populations in most of
these countries have to meet all (or most) of the costs of
care in user fees, which they pay ‘out-of-pocket’. The
proportion who find themselves in this position varies
considerably of course from country to country, but even
in those countries which aim to guarantee universal cover-
age for health care services, there are may still be various
kinds of medical care that are not covered as well as rela-
tively high out-of-pocket payments to be made. Prior to
2001 about 40% of the Thai population were not covered
by any health insurance scheme and had to pay user fees
whether they went to public or private health care facili-
ties. Since 2001 coverage has been extended to the whole
population. It remains, however, an open question what
kinds of non-acute care (e.g. home-based care) might be
included within the new collective health financing scheme
(Chunsharas, 2003).
Contrast this with the situation in China, which is marked,
firstly, by enormous disparities in both pension and health
coverage between urban and rural areas, and secondly, by
extraordinarily high levels of internal migration from rural
areas to cities (with most migrants having no pension and
health coverage12). Some cities in China, such as Shanghai,
offer a home-bed medical service for people who are perma-
nently housebound and include financial support for this
service in their medical insurance scheme. Not all conur-
bations offer such extensive medical insurance coverage,
however – and even where the ‘home-bed’ service exists
and is affordable, there tends to be a lack of public confi-
dence in its quality (Hua, 2003). Outside the conurbations,
in rural areas, people are much less likely to have any
health insurance, and notwithstanding the existence of an
extensive network of public hospitals and clinics, out-of-
pocket payments make up a much greater proportion of total
health care spending in rural than in urban areas. In 2002
Chinese households paid 58% of health care expenses out-
of-pocket – and that figure will be much higher in the
countryside than in the cities (Howe and Jackson, 2004). 
In circumstances such as these the policy relevance of the
distinction between (i) the institutional arrangements for
meeting the long-term needs for medical and nursing care
that arise as a result of chronic disabling illness and (ii) the
arrangements for meeting the long-term needs for daily life
care that often arise as a result of the same conditions must
be quite different from what it is in most developed coun-
tries. Perhaps the main relevance of this distinction for
policy-makers in developing countries is that it provides the
context for an analysis of priorities, for decisions about the
nature of the additional formal provision that is likely to
make the most difference to the well-being of the older
people with complex care needs. Given that older people
with chronic ill-health or disabilities may well need regular
medical care, regular nursing care, and regular daily life
care, it is important to be able to decide what mix of addi-
tional formal services is likely to yield the most benefit.
The point to note here is not that one kind of care – that
which depends on professionally trained physicians and
nurses as well as the technologies they are able to utilise –
is relatively scarce whilst that which requires no such skills
is relatively easy to obtain through the family. The problem
that population ageing poses for many developing countries
is that the supply of family-based daily life care is dimin-
ishing at the same time as health care services are having
to adjust to the very sharp rise in the prevalence of chronic
illness and disability. The point therefore is that the limited
availability (and affordability) of any kind of formal provi-
sion of services (whether medical or non-medical,
institutional or community-based) for long-term care needs
that result from chronic disabling disease is clearly an essen-
tial part of the context for formulating and assessing policy
options; and it is this fact to which the analysts writing in
the WHO report insistently draw attention. 
It has to remembered also that in some middle-income and
many low-income countries, the majority of the older popu-
lation receive no old-age pension of any kind, and hence
they have to rely either on their own current earnings (or
their personal capital if they have any) or their family for
their material support.13 In this case, older people are quite
likely to co-reside with adult children in a multi-generational
household; and here they become part of the overall
economy of the household.14 They are very often major
contributors as well as beneficiaries within a complex web
of reciprocal intergenerational exchanges. Even if they are
prevented by chronic-ill-health or disability from working
outside the household they may still be able (and expected)
to help with domestic chores and care of grandchildren.
Once they lose the ability to make these kinds of contri-
bution to the household, they then become dependent – in
the widest and strongest sense – on their family for support
and care: they rely on them to provide for their basics
needs without having anything to offer in return. A very
considerable proportion of the people who need help to
prepare the food they eat will not have enough income of
their own to purchase it – and in such circumstances it may
seem pointless to make much of the distinction between the
help that the family provides with daily life care and the
support it provides for material well-being, i.e. food and
lodging. Certainly from the point of view of the adult chil-
dren who provide support for their elderly parents, these
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two kinds of need merge into each other (see, e.g. Zhang
and Goza, 2006). As with the distinction between daily life
care and illness care, however, it does provide policy-
makers with a context for the analysis of priorities.
Decisions about how best to help families bear the strains
that population ageing imposes on informal systems of old-
age care and support have to take into account the fact that
many relatively poor families are likely to be giving up
income as well as time and labour to look after their older
members. 
A problem of justice?
The problem of care is a complicated logistical problem
for any society. It is also, most emphatically, an
ethical problem, a problem that must be addressed not
only with resourceful policy thinking but also with the
best normative thinking that we can muster. All too
often, economic thought addressing this problem
proceeds as if it is only a matter of efficiency, and not
as well as matter of justice and equity. The first step
in addressing this problem is to recognise that it is an
ethical problem, a problem of justice.
Nussbaum, 2004, p.34
Nussbaum, a moral philosopher, is perhaps too dismissive
here of the “logistical problems” involved in matching
resources to needs in any system of publicly subsidised
long-term care. It is surely possible, however, to concede
that it is extraordinarily difficult to allocate such resources
efficiently, to make sure, in other words, that they go to
the people who will gain most benefit from them (Baldock,
1997); and yet still agree with Nussbaum that some of the
fundamental issues that societies have to decide in settling
on any set of public arrangements for the provision of long-
term care turn on questions of fairness rather than questions
of allocative efficiency. 
Certainly if we suppose that the basic issue to be settled is
the balance of public and private responsibility in the provi-
sion of help with daily life care, then we are very likely to
agree with Nussbaum on this point. The policy choices we
make will reflect our judgements about the extent to which
– as well as the way in which – the burden of care should
be shared through public institutions and collective arrange-
ments. Since, even in OECD countries, the major part of
this burden takes the form of unpaid work undertaken by
the families of people who need help with daily life care,
this decision must incorporate some sort of view about the
share of the burden of providing long-term care that fami-
lies may be fairly expected to shoulder in this form. And
since the help with daily life care that is not provided by
unpaid labour has to be purchased, it also has to be decided
to what extent the financial costs of purchasing long-term
care should be born by the individuals who need it. These
issues, though evidently connected, are clearly distinct. It
could be argued, for example, that the full costs of purchas-
ing care for someone who needs it should be shared amongst
people who do not themselves need care (mostly the active
working population) – which is quite compatible with the
view that the amount or kind of care which is purchased
should take some account of the availability of family care-
givers to provide unpaid care. And similarly, the view that
nothing in the way of unpaid work should be expected of
the close family of someone who needs care is compatible
with the advocacy of financing arrangements that require
most people who need care to bear a considerable portion
of the costs of purchasing it. 
The role of families in the provision of care
In most OECD countries it is now widely accepted that fami-
lies cannot be expected to supply in the form of unpaid work
whatever additional help with daily life care is likely to be
needed as a result of population ageing. Although this is
partly a matter of realism – not only will the sharp decline
in fertility reduce the ‘capacity’ of the family to provide
help in this form, but most of the countries are actively
pursuing labour market policies that will further reduce the
potential supply of family-based care – there also has to be
taken into account a strong weight of opinion in favour of
‘voluntarism’ in family caregiving. The argument here is
not just that families cannot be expected in all fairness to
do more in the way of unpaid work than they are doing
now. The point is rather that it is unfair of the wider
community to expect or require anything of family members
in the way of unpaid care.15 Potential family caregivers
should be able to choose whether or not to provide care
(Nussbaum, 2004)16 – and (ideally) whether or not to be
reimbursed for the care they choose to provide.
Many policy-makers in advanced industrialised countries are
clearly reluctant to acknowledge voluntarism as a basis for
reforming the public provision of long-term care because of
‘the public expenditure consequences of reimbursing what
was previously a gift relationship’ (Pearson and Martin, 2005,
p.30). The worry is that any additional funding intended as
a response to population ageing might be used to purchase
what was previously provided free rather than to increase the
total supply of care. For some analysts this particular concern
helps to define the policy problem that is posed by the increas-
ing strains that demographic and socio-cultural change are
placing on traditional mechanisms of care: how can the
arrangements for public provision be improved so as to relieve
these strains without adding to the pressures which are likely
to reduce the supply of unpaid care?
It has already been noted (see above) that the long-term care
regime in Sweden, which is one of the most generous in
the world, appears to rejects what we might call ‘unre-
stricted’ voluntarism. There is a clear expectation that
spouses – though not adult children – should provide some
degree of unpaid care. It seems reasonable to suppose that
the basis for this distinction is that marriage – unlike the
relationship between adult children and their parents – is
contracted voluntarily. In other words, what justifies the
wider community in expecting spouses to fulfil their obli-
gations to each other is not merely the peculiarly intimate
nature of the relationship, but also the fact that it has been
entered into voluntarily. 
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Means-testing and universalism
The corollary of accepting that families cannot be expected
in all fairness to do more in the way of unpaid work than
they are doing now is not just that a great deal more care
has to be purchased – but that the financial costs of purchas-
ing a much larger volume of services have to be shared out
fairly between the people who need care and those who do
not. For some developed countries (such as the UK and the
USA), this issue has raised the question of whether or not
existing arrangements for sharing the costs of purchasing
care across the wider community are fair – quite apart from
any additional costs expected as a result of population
ageing. Is the balance of public and private responsibility
more or less right as things now stand? For others (such
as Sweden), where there appears to be a broad consensus
about the fairness of existing arrangements, the focus of the
policy problem is how to maintain fairness under conditions
of population ageing.
The choice whether or not to extend the reach of social soli-
darity in meeting the costs of purchasing care to include
everyone who needs it and not just those people who lack
the financial means to buy it for themselves is likely to be
an important focus for disagreement in those countries
where the fairness of existing arrangements is still a live
issue (as in the UK and USA). Should access to publicly
subsidised care be means-tested or not? The main argument
for extending social solidarity beyond what are usually
regarded as the minimum requirements of justice is famil-
iar, namely that the need for care, and hence the cost of
the care that is needed, is highly variable and uncertain.
Not everyone needs care in old age and the amount of care
that people need varies enormously, with a substantial
minority requiring very expensive institutional care – at a
cost which may exhaust not only their personal income but
also whatever personal wealth they may possess. There is
therefore a kind of lottery in the distribution of the cost
burden associated with the need for long-term care; and even
if no-one is reduced to poverty as a result of paying for it,
some people will find that their financial resources are
depleted much more than others (see, e.g. Kemper et al.,
2005). Whether or not it is the business of government to
protect people against this risk (rather than encouraging
them to protect themselves) is of course a matter on which
free-market conservatives and social democrats will
profoundly disagree.17
Inside and outside the OECD
The balance of public and private responsibility in the
matter of long-term care is tipped most heavily towards
social solidarity in burden-sharing when it is accepted (i)
that nothing in the way of unpaid work should be expected
of the close family of someone who needs care and (ii) that
the full costs of purchasing care for someone who needs it
should be shared amongst people who are not themselves
currently in need of care (mostly the active working popu-
lation). It is not easy, however, to find an OECD country
where this particular combination of views underlies the
arrangements for publicly subsidised long-term care
(Denmark perhaps?). There seems rather to be a conver-
gence towards the view that (i) universal programmes can
justify some measure of cost-sharing in the form of user
charges (OECD, 2005), and (ii) the commitment to volun-
tarism is hard to sustain.
What about the middle-income countries discussed above?
They all take a ‘minimalist’ approach to burden-sharing by
the wider community: it will meet the costs of purchasing
help with daily life care only for people who have no family
to look after them and who are too poor to pay for it them-
selves. Rather more than this, however, needs to be said,
if we want to distinguish their position from that of the
OECD countries. Certainly their reluctance to replace
means-tested programmes with universal programmes is
shared by at least some OECD countries.
Just as any system of publicly subsidised long-term care has
to decide how much (and what kind of) paid care of should
be provided to the people who are entitled to it, so too any
system that expects something from potential family care-
givers in the way of unpaid care is faced with the problem
of deciding how much it is reasonable to expect of families
in this way. And what seems to distinguishes the middle-
income countries from the OECD countries in this respect
is not that they reject ‘voluntarism’ (so do many OECD
countries) – nor indeed that they reject the contractualist
view of personal obligation which appear to underlie the
Swedish system (so do some OECD countries)18 – but rather
how much they expect of families. In China and Thailand,
for example, there is not really much prospect of bringing
any paid help with daily life care into households where
there is an older person who already receives unpaid care
from close family. Nor is it likely that publicly subsidised
institutional care will be made available to older people with
families unless they require a considerable amount of regular
medical or nursing care as well as help with daily life care.
The policy response to population ageing looks quite differ-
ent, therefore, inside and outside the OECD: the less
affluent countries are much less willing to accept that fami-
lies cannot be expected in all fairness to do more in the
way of unpaid work than they are doing now. Perhaps we
could say that the guiding objective of reform in these coun-
tries is not to lift off from the shoulders of the family the
additional strains that demographic and socio-cultural change
will impose on them as providers of unpaid care – but
rather to put systems into place that will help the family
bear the additional strains that it will almost certainly have
to carry. They are staking their medium-term future on the
willingness and capacity of the family to bear these addi-
tional strains – which is not really the case in the more
developed countries. 
Concluding remarks: resource constraints
and development paths
Ultimately what differentiates developed societies with
ageing populations from developing societies with ageing
populations is their prosperity. There is a handful of
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countries, especially in Asia, that used to be counted as
part of the developing world but have now already
grown rich and are also growing old very fast indeed.
And then there are some other countries, most notably
perhaps China, that have a chance of growing rich
before they grow old – but may well grow old before
they become rich (Howe and Jackson, 2004). Decisions
about the extension of public benefits for the care and
support of the older population clearly have to be seen
in the context of resource constraints determined in part
by the development path on which the country is set. In
a country such as China the perceived threat of demo-
graphic ageing is that they will grow old before they
grow rich – which will seriously hobble them in their
efforts to become rich – and this perception is bound to
influence the view that government takes on the best
balance between investment for economic growth and
consumption for present needs. 
Should this have any implications for the way in which we
think about the ‘requirements of justice’ in sharing the
burden of long-term care in developing as opposed to devel-
oped countries? The question is large and difficult, and all
that can be done here is gesture towards some of the issues
it raises. We would have to clarify, for example, the reason-
ing behind the ‘contractualist’ view of family obligation as
it appears in the Swedish LTC system. Nor is it possible
to ignore the feminist concerns that are so important for
Nussbaum’s argument. In other words, we are bound to
consider the implications of choosing to rely on intergen-
erational solidarity as a major source of unpaid care for
the position of women in the household and the wider
society. And finally we would have to articulate criteria for
deciding on the limits of what it is reasonable to expect from
families in the way of unpaid care – and see how they
should be applied in countries that are as different as Sweden
and China.
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Notes
1 According to Johnson and Uccello (2005) about 40% of
Americans spend some time in a nursing home before they
die.
2 Though most states allow applicants to subtract medical and LTC
expenses from income before determining eligibility.
3 Since Medicaid rules still make it difficult for frail older people
to receive public support for home-based care, the system also
seriously distorts the choice between home-based care and
institutionally-provided care.
4 A great deal of American analysis of the challenges for long-
term care policy focuses on the ‘problem’ of the lack of demand
for private long-term care insurance. For a useful overview, see
Johnson and Uccello (2005).
5 There is an earnings ceiling above which employees are not
enrolled into the scheme, and about 9% of the German
population have private LTC insurance cover (Arntz et al.,
2007). 
6 Pensioners also pay contributions, and now do so entirely from
their own pockets. Prior to 2004 they received a special
contribution subsidy from the pension funds. 
7 England and Wales are in a different position in this matter from
Scotland, where it was decided that the ‘personal care’ element
in LTC should be free.
8 This stands in marked contrast to the opening up of debate on
the use of capital funding for mandatory LTC insurance in
Germany (Arntz et al., 2007).
9 The assertion is usually intended to reassure us that social
change is not undermining the willingness of families in
advanced industrial countries to provide care and support for
their older members; and also to remind policy-makers of the
importance of informal sources of this kind of long-term care –
and hence of the importance of helping families to provide this
care when their ability to do so is threatened or impaired. 
10 The terminology comes from the WHO report on China, which
makes the point that most caregivers are female and usually
provide both daily life care and illness care.
11 The rest have some form of private health insurance.
12 See e.g. Xu et al.,2007.
13 In China, for example, about three-quarters of the workforce
have no pension coverage at all (Howe and Jackson, 2004). See, 
also Peng and Phillips (2004) and Heller (2006) for brief
summaries of the availability of old-age pensions in China. Older
people, and this applies not only to China of course, who have
neither pension nor close family are clearly at serious risk of
destitution once they lose the ability to support themselves
through employment. If they are also in need of help with daily
life care, then their position is even worse. All of the countries
examined in the WHO report provide some kind of publicly
subsidised care for older people who have no family to look
after them and insufficient income to support themselves. In
other words, they provide a limited amount of institutional care
as part of their basic welfare programmes, and this will often
include help with daily life care.
13 As ever, we should be wary of generalisations, but to take China
again as an example, according to the 2001 census, 64% of
elders aged 65 years or more live with their children (usually a
son); and they receive most of their income from the same
source (Howe and Jackson, 2004).
15 Which means not merely that there should be no legal
compulsion in the matter, but also that decisions about
entitlements to publicly subsidized care should take no account of
the availability of unpaid family care, i.e. they should be ‘carer-
blind’ (Pickard, 2001). 
16 For Nussbaum one of the most powerful arguments for the
unfairness of requiring anything of families in the way of unpaid
care is that familial obligations to provide unpaid care typically
bind women to the household. 
17 Consider, for example, the very different views that have been
expressed about the role of LTC insurance for middle-income
families with assets to bequeath. Whereas Moses (2005) is
clearly unhappy with the idea that it is the business of
government to provide “inheritance insurance for the baby
boomers and their children”, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation
(1996) appealed to the role of LTC insurance in protecting
heritable assets as an argument in favour of their proposal for a
social insurance scheme.
18 Since this line of reasoning explicitly absolves adult children
from any responsibility to help their parents with daily life care,
it would almost certainly be rejected by many developing
countries with rapidly ageing populations.
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Abstract
The paper aims to explain and evaluate two key features
of Securing Good Care for Older People, the Wanless
Report on alternative mechanisms for funding long-term
care of older people. One is the new elements of the
methodology for evaluating the alternatives (section 1.1).
The paper argues that more successfully than previously
and analyses in other countries, these elements focus atten-
tion on what are really the core issues: the means and ends
which are the unique foci of long-term care, and estimates
of the consequences of alternatives for them. By doing so,
the report faces the politicians and policy analysis and
research communities with a formidable challenge, to
master and contribute to the development of the new
framework and evidence. Failure to meet the challenge will
increases the risk that the policy system will reinforce
rather than weaken causes of gross inequity and ineffi-
ciency caused by the under-funding of long-term care
seemingly unanswerably demonstrated by the report. The
second key feature is the type of funding model the Report
recommends given expected changes in the balance
between demands and public expenditure. Section 1.2
argues that the report’s analysis as successfully transforms
the state of the argument about this as much as about the
framework, methodology and evidence for evaluating alter-
natives, demonstrating the relative weakness of models
widely advocated a decade ago. Part 2 discusses how to
build on the Report. Section 2.1 discusses the framing of
issues and the analysis of evidence for each of the key foci
of the report’s main contribution to evaluation methodol-
ogy. Section 2.2 discusses whether the recommended
model would be the wisest choice given the environment
likely during the next few decades. 
Introduction
In every generation, a few reports redefine issues of current
moment in a way which could set the framework for
evidence-based discourse, often for a long period. This is
so of the report of the Wanless team’s review (hereafter
WR) (Wanless et al., 2006). It will have less impact than
it should unless this is widely enough recognised not just
in academe but far beyond. And its most important contri-
butions are precisely those whose application in other
countries could advance their discourse also. 
In particular, it engages the means and ends which are
really at the heart of long-term care debate. Starting with
quantified descriptions of what levels, balance and inci-
dence of outcomes are most valued by citizens (and are the
declared aims of policy intervention), and how they can be
most fairly and efficiently produced, it works back to
resources and costs and who would pay how much for what
value of benefit given each of a set of exemplar funding
models. It shows that some model types could not suffi-
ciently satisfy enough of the general criteria to play anything
more than a supporting role, if that. The patterns of benefit
differ from one another and so confer varying ratios of bene-
fits to costs to groups though much the same in effectiveness
judged by the most general of the WR criteria, but likely
to attract different advocates. As the models have been
designed and parameterised by WR, the ‘partnership model’
has the edge, it argues. 
It provides this key insight without neglecting the many
criteria which recent analyses recognise should affect judg-
ments about systems in policy and political processes, from
the broadest principles to the most focussed analyses of costs
and benefits by subgroups of the population. Analyses of
the properties of model types, indeed of multiple exemplars
of parameterised models of each of several types (as with
the analysis of costs and the incidence of costs and bene-
fits on groups defined in various ways), have been
transformed in their sophistication and detail. But it is the
WR which is the first internationally to fill the key gap: to
provide a methodology for evaluating alternative funding
mechanisms starting from quantitative evidence about
citizen’s valuations for the specific benefits which are the
raison d’être of long term care policy and quantitative
knowledge about how to produce them most efficiently.
Think of the alternative: without this WR methodology, we
are doomed to asking partially irrelevant questions and
providing only partially relevant evidence to answer them,
not the ones directly about the ends and means which the
policy process has honed in its long learning experience.
Without it, we should be able to compare funding models
by their outcomes for the income, educational, cultural
minority, gender, social class, and many other relevant
distributions of costs to public and private funds and the
monetary costs of services received. But we should be
unable to compare their distributions of public and private
costs and the value of the net benefits of care as these are
perceived by potential beneficiaries for groups defined by
the need criteria of long-term care in general, and the policy
paradigm for social care in particular. 
The application of this new methodology makes WR’s case
a formidable challenge. The WR framework assembles key
new components, some the basis of publications only during
the last decade or so. Although the argument it bases on
them is itself sophisticated, and based on complex models
and detailed analysis of large amounts of evidence, above
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all it suggests the great practical benefits from strengthen-
ing the knowledge base. It is all the more a challenge to
those seeking to create the knowledge it needs because
crossing boundaries between intellectual communities is
difficult, uncomfortable and risky, and it is dangerous to
narrow readerships by using argument whose basis is analy-
sis which many cannot follow: gurus chant KISS – Keep it
Simple and Sequential. But in this field the public interest
demands that we do the opposite. And requisite engagement
of the complexity is a challenge not just to those advanc-
ing knowledge but also to the higher official with many other
concerns than this, the policy analyst in a pressure group,
the specialist journalist, and politicians.
It would greatly handicap policy development were insuf-
ficient policy leaders, analysts and others to learn to
understand and use the new frameworks and methods. What
would be tragic would be for people not to attempt to
contribute to the new argument. Hence the form and content
of the paper. It is to help the reader understand some essen-
tials of the WR framework and argument and how to
improve it and discuss how the momentum can be main-
tained. 
1. Analytic framework and evaluation
methodology 
The Wanless team’s key methodological contribution to the
evaluation of alternative funding models has been to combine
quantified knowledge about the levels and mixes of
outcomes from mixes of services with citizen valuations of
the levels of outcomes. WR did so in two stages of the
analysis, each a breakthrough for the discussion of the WR
topic. The first was to develop a methodology for setting
a threshold level for the outcomes obtained from an incre-
ment of cost to public funds above which subsidy should be
made. The second was to provide a methodology for
comparing the relative benefits given costs from alternative
models (weighting benefits by older people’s valuations of
them). That methodology was key to the final stage of the
evaluation of funding mechanisms. 
1.1 Threshold value above which subsidise 
The threshold is based on the selection of a value of the
increase in benefit obtained from the service obtained using
an increment of subsidy; that is, an incremental benefit/cost
ratio.1 The selection is based on incremental benefit/cost
ratios in competing policy areas, reflecting estimates of the
threshold beyond citizens would not be willing to pay for
additional gain. 
ADLAY: a generic measure of the value of outcomes. The
value of the benefit is a generic indicator of welfare of the
kinds which social care is intended to produce. WR’s
generic indicator is the value of outcomes of services
intended to compensate for limitations in activities of daily
living due to disability, either physical or mental. The esti-
mate of benefits is for the year. So the Report calls the
generic indicator the ADLAY, the ADL-adjusted year. 
The estimation of incremental benefit/cost ratios requires
both a) knowledge about how outcomes differ given vari-
ation in the costs of inputs, other things being equal – what
economists call the ‘production function’, and b) valuations
of outcome levels to use as weights to compute the overall
value of benefits. 
Production functions. Figure 1 reproduces WR’s illustra-
tion of a (‘reduced form’ of the) production function for
one outcome and one service, for the contribution of home
care to ‘producing’ extra time supported in the community,
from the ECCEP study which estimated production relations
for 19 outcomes of value in their own right (Davies,
Fernandez and Nomer, 2000). The figure illustrates the
shape of the mathematical form most commonly describing
the effects of variations in service levels on outcomes.2
The effects of increments of input are smaller as input
levels increase.3 The figure also illustrates that the effects
of the services depend greatly on circumstances of users and
carers, a result consonant with the predictability of outcomes
from risk factors. The patterns confirm the importance of
using production function techniques, incorporating
equation forms which allow theoretically likely complex
forms to reveal themselves.4 Estimates for social care do
indeed have several of these features, illustrating why
attempts to estimate the relations between service levels
and mixes (and costs) and outcomes often yield absurd
results.5
Outcome dimensions. WR used OPUS as a tool for
outcome measurement and the value weighting of outcomes
(Netten et al., 2005). The outcome domains used in the WR
analysis were: personal care and comfort; social participa-
tion and involvement; control over daily life; meals and
nutrition; safety; accommodation; employment and occu-
pation; role support (as carer or parent), and being in their
own home.6
The selection of OPUS was politically shrewd, because
OPUS was originally influenced by the assumptive worlds
of those faced with balancing needs and the allocation of
public spending of a period which was more pessimistic
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Figure 1: Effects of home care and day care on the extra
time an older person remains in the community 
about the balance between needs and resources than that of
earlier classifications of outcome and their indicators.7 What
is key for avoiding biased estimates and a balanced descrip-
tion is that it should include all important outcomes. Some
to which the attention of some in the policy world wavered
as spending grew more slowly than demands was user
morale, the probability and severity of the sub-clinical and
clinical depression which between them are so prevalent in
the population at risk (Davenand et al., 1996; Livingston
et al., 1996, Saunders et al., 1993, and their carers (Buck
et al., 2002). Improvements in them are outcomes valued
in their own right.8 Some early British argument was that
the production of morale effects for many (as means, ends
or by-products) were hallmarks of high quality and efficient
systems, with enhanced user influence on the prioritisation
of ends and choice of means being important in the causal
process (Davies and Challis, 1986; Davies and Missiakoulis,
1988). More recent research differentiates good from bad
commissioning and service quality by referring to related
causal processes (Patmore, 2006; Sinclair et al., 2000).
More directly, modelling research on substantial data from
a variety of areas suggest that during the nineties, the
reforms caused services to produce substantial outcomes for
morale and depression-associated variables.9
The same (or co-produced and highly correlated) effects are
once again highly valued in policy statements. Despite fiscal
stringency10 whose effects at the local level has been well
documented by user, professional and local government
interest groups and others (Health and Care News, 2007;
CSCI, 2006), the green paper of 2005 (DH, 2005) coura-
geously made a political commitment to goals related to
morale, wellbeing and associated concepts: courageously –
because it thereby made the widening gap between aspira-
tions and achievements the focus of public attention –
including the consequences of the targeting consequences
of stringency that the Commission for Social Care Inspection
[CSCI] has promised to ‘focus on in its report for 2006–07’
(Carson, 2006; CSCI, 2006c, LGA, 2006, 2007). So these
goals now have a higher policy priority during the mid00s
than such goals had among hard-pressed managers at the
end of the previous decade, giving them an importance
closer to that in some other leading countries from the mid
1980s.11
In this respect, the new policy statements of the mid-00s
are closer to the articulation of the social care paradigm in
1989 and 1990 in Caring for People, the associated guid-
ance papers (especially those for field managers and
workers; DH, 1990a, b), and the literature which first
included morale, wellbeing, and life satisfaction as outcome
criteria.13 The green paper Independence Wellbeing and
Choice (DH, 2005) made much of the wellbeing agenda and
specified a key role for Directors of Adult Social Care. The
outcome goals from the Green Paper were reflected in crite-
ria of quality developed by the CSCI (2006). One of the
outcome domains is ‘Quality of Life’, another ‘Improved
Health and Emotional Wellbeing’. The latter was elaborated
with, inter alia, the statement that that ‘emotional and
mental health needs are responded to and appropriately
addressed’ (CSCI 2006, pp.7–10). 
The WR methodology is being rapidly developed. Though
OPUS does not have the equivalent of a morale dimension
per se, its developers are ‘committed to seeking to cover
all the consequences of the impairment disability or hand-
icap due to all causes (physical, cognitive impairment, other
mental health problem) for the performance of key personal
care and ‘instrumental acts of daily living in the circum-
stances of users and carers.’ Therefore work is in progress
to develop a morale dimension, and as far as statistically
possible to map existing OPUS dimensions onto all CSCI
domains. WR applied both the narrower ‘core business’
concept and a broader concept attempting to cover wellbe-
ing. But by presenting estimates for stringently defined core
business alone as well as the broader concept, WR could
not be accused of Utopian optimism about the ease with
which allocations of public spending to social care could
be raised. 
Valuation of outcome dimensions. The relative value of
increments of each output must be weighted to derive the
total value of outcomes required for broad allocation judge-
ments. The valuations used by WR were derived for a
sample of older citizens, only some of whom were users.
A sample of older people was selected partly because it was
assumed that they would be aware of the issues. Results
showed that preferences were asssociated with user and
carer circumstances; and in particular, with whether they
had actually had experience of the services.
Selecting the threshold to equalise costs of values
across policy votes. It would strengthen the basis for
allocations across policy areas competing for a share of
the same budget to be able to compare the benefit/cost
ratios for each area’s marginal expenditures. The inven-
tion of the ADLAY does this. The QALY, an analogous
generic indicator for health outcomes is widely applied.
Most famously, it is used by NICE, the National Institute
for Clinical Excellence, in the evaluation of new phar-
maceuticals and treatments. WR set the threshold
maximum cost per ADLAY at £20 thousand. The Chair
of NICE recently commented that ‘anything around
about £20,000 per QALY is likely to be regarded as
cost-effective. Beyond about £30,000 per QALY, we
wouldn’t necessarily say ‘no’, but you’ve got to have
14
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better . . . reasons for saying “yes”’ (Rawlins, 2007). He
related these thresholds to estimates of approximately
£32,000 for the value of a lost life because of a road
accident averted by public spending. He described how
there were exceptional circumstances in which NICE had
approved pharmaceuticals whose costs per QALY were
much greater: for instance, Riluzol, which ‘avoids the
need for tracheotomy for about six months for victims
of Motor Neurone Disease... [because] people with
tracheotomy say it’s almost worse than death’, and for
which NICE’s estimate of the costs per QALY was
approximately £38,000.13
WR was shrewd to base the threshold on an ADLAY
concept and to choose £20,000 per ADLAY as the thresh-
old. The subsidy to social care being paid from the vote of
the DH, NHS heads are adult social care’s closest competi-
tors in the budgeting process. The ADLAY is designed to
be a close analogue of the QALY, and the QALY is the
accepted generic indicator of the value of health care
outcomes. Given that NICE would almost take for granted
that additional public expenditures yielding a QALY for
£20,000 would be cost-effective, it would seem difficult for
government to deny special funding approval for forms of
social care expenditure with a cost per ADLAY consider-
ably exceeding £20,000 in circumstances in which it would
relieve situations judged to be ‘almost worse than death’.
What about some manifestations and stages of dementia
about which The Guardian (2007) wrote ‘for those directly
afflicted, the unremitting erosion of independence can
resemble torture’?14
Of course, for this argument to hold, it has to be broadly
accepted that an ADLAY is roughly equivalent in value to
a QALY, and that estimates of costs per ADLAY and per
QALY are valid and reliable enough to provide a useful if
crude guide. Results of the research mapping QALY and
other generic indicators for health on ADLAY will provide
evidence. A more formidable obstacle to the comparison is
that generic outcome indicators have not been applied
systematically to health policy areas. Kind and Williams
(2004, 1) wrote: ‘It is remarkable that we know so little
about the health improvements brought about by the enor-
mous array of activities provided by the NHS, but in recent
years some piecemeal attempts have been made to rectify
the situation’. They recommend the systematic application
of EQ-5D to all areas of health services; a major step
towards comprehensive and systematic QALY analysis. One
of its five dimensions is Anxiety and Depression, possibly
close enough to be mapped onto a social care morale and
wellbeing dimension. 
1.2 Comparing funding options 
Selection of funding options. WR designed funding model
types, and undertook a general evaluation of model exem-
plars of eight of the types chosen to provide variety.15 The
types were ‘free personal care’, ‘social insurance’, ‘means-
tested public funding’, ‘the partnership model’, ‘limited
liability’ (a version of the American Connecticut Partnership
and its descendants, including the Conservative ‘partnership’
model: DHSS (1997), Care Savings Account, and private
insurance. 
Space does not permit a description of the first stage of the
evaluation at which model types were systematically scored
by the general criteria developed in the literature. The first
stage dismissed some runners which had been thought poten-
tial winners a decade ago, indeed later (Brodsky et al.,
2003; Gibson et al., 2003; OECD, 2005); and are still
promoted in some countries. Some of the types offering
more universal cover like German long term care (social)
insurance, and by implication treated by some as if impor-
tant elements (if not the entire model) could well be applied
in England, did not score highly when all the criteria were
taken into account. That the UK’s social care paradigm
uses a much wider and more subtle range of criteria for the
evaluation of policy success in long-term care than those
for which evidence is available for countries which have
adopted the social insurance route is relevant because policy-
makers tend to look for models elsewhere which work better
by their paradigm’s criteria (Rose, 1991). Perhaps also
some recent history of the schemes contributed to their
lower ratings: crude reliance on risk factors not welfare
shortfalls in the implicit definition of eligibility and allo-
cations; inefficiencies in the production of welfare outcomes;
inflexibilities in response to worsening balances of demands
and income flows in two of the best known long-term care
insurance systems; the replacement of the well established
Dutch arrangements by some more like those in Sweden and
England.16
WR concluded that two exemplars of the eight families best
met the general criteria. These were ‘free personal care’ of
which a variant had been implemented in Scotland, and ‘the
partnership model’, in which the state would finance ‘a basic,
minimum level of care’, and would match private payments
above that up to a maximum package cost ‘set in line with
available resources’ (WR 2006, p.231). The partnership
model satisfied the WR effectiveness-equity-efficiency
criteria somewhat better: ‘a more sophisticated and less
costly mechanism’ WR commented. They were compared
with a re-parameterised version of the existing means-testing
model. Although a means-testing model with substantially
different values set for all its parameters could yield greatly
improved performance compared with the present, its basic
features interferes with equalizing the incremental benefit/cost
ratios of what users would actually consume, a prerequisite
for optimal achievement of the goal implicit in the policy
goals. Some distortions would be basically similar to those
of the present system, re-parameterisation reducing but not
removing them. There is no escaping the fundamental truth.
Poor Law mechanisms were designed for another age.
Perhaps only argument based on the slow adaptation of
cultures behaviours and supply systems or a value shift more
thoroughly subordinating  social policy to the requirements
of an age of ferocious global competition could make them
acceptable; and in the former case, only temporarily. We
return to the theme below. 
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2. Discussion 
2.1. Issue framing and evidence analysis 
WR has shifted the discourse enough to make some comfort-
able intellectual habits more difficult to square with the
public interest. That is illustrated in three areas where by
the use of new (and more technically demanding) method-
ologies, WR has shifted the framework for discourse. 
Advancing knowledge about how resource inputs affect
valued outcomes. This is the most formidable challenge –
to understand how and in what way through time events and
circumstances affect the impact of resource: user and carer
circumstances, values and cultures underlying expectations,
behaviour and preferences; supply-side cultures, policies,
processes and practice, endowments, circumstances affect-
ing the pattern of productivities of service. So easy to write,
so difficult for the research world to achieve, it requires
the use of a wide enough range of social science in design-
ing collections and their analysis, recognition of the
connection between what they are finding and the broad
framework of policy discourse. For what proportion of the
time of what proportion of our working lives are we
researchers happily hacking our way through the wood
without understanding the importance of those twigs and
leaves for undersanding a world of great and subtle varia-
tions in what counts and what affects its individuals? 
Valuing outcomes. The history has been too short for there
to have been time to explore the forms of interrelatedness
of preferences and their dependence on circumstances and
characteristics: the equivalent in utility analysis of data
collection designs and the equation forms which allow
complicated joint supply, non-linearities and non-monoto-
nicities, substitution and complementarity effects (many
already themes of utility theory) to show themselves – the
interdependence of utilities of persons within a network, the
dependence of the marginal valuation for one outcome on
the level of another achieved, circumstances in which mech-
anisms which distort perceptions and expressions of
preference work in what way. Already there is evidence that
preferences are associated with users’, carers’ and other citi-
zens’ circumstances; and in particular, and predictably,
whether they have actually experienced of services.17 There
are other issues which are tricky in other ways also.18 19
Whose valuations should be sought? The Pareto principle
on which much normative economics is based might suggest
the most relevant preferences would be the user and carer
populations and those most at risk, though sensitivity of
valuations to the degree of unmet seem often to be reduced
by psychological adaptation to their position. However the
general citizen would be expected to foot the subsidy bill.
Should their preferences should be altogether discounted if
they do not agree to it? The issue has long been recognized.
Alan Williams wrote in 1974 that at ‘the heart of the matter
... is a societal judgment as to who shall play what role
according to what rules’ (p.71), clearly still one factor
underlying differences in arguments about policy and
funding models today. 
Projecting costs, outcome values and their incidence.
Like all reports since the Royal Commission on Long-Term
Care, WR uses more elaborate simulation modelling
methodologies to project consequences over its time horizon
to 2026. Indeed, continuity in the discourse has been helped
by them all using the same model and its descendants and
elaborations. Again, the challenge is the same: to cross
subject and topic boundaries, to recognise the development
of the knowledge base for projecting the consequences of
alternative funding mechanism as something to which an
apparently unrelated analysis of data base can contribute.
Because some societies have potential for suggesting trends
in structures and cultures in others and anticipation of
scenario evolution is the key, add the information for the
imaginative basis for the models from other societies. Again,
there are the same obstacles: those who have investigated
the right areas have not thought it useful to ask the ques-
tions the answers to which would best develop the WR-type
framework. Perhaps it will help that more states will come
to develop WR-type argument. When they do so, we can
expect a greater variety in assumptions and so in the archi-
tecture of projection models: a great stimulus to intellectual
progress. 
The mushroom growth of climate change theory illustrates
why. Projection of demand and supply of long-term care
has some characteristics in common with the projection of
climate change and its consequences – a relatively new area
with a rapid increase in understanding, great sensitivity in
estimates to assumptions about trends20, the potential for
differences in the fundamental architecture of the causal
models implicit in the projections models, deep uncertainty
and so the need to attempt to attach probabilities to scenar-
ios, differences in perspectives and interest in what should
be a transparent and pluralist discourse about alternative
policies and so a preference for different position on the
probability distributions of greatest interest to the partici-
pant. 
The Stern Report suggests how the subject might develop.
Projections are summarised in Figure 3. As in long-term
care projections – for instance the plotting of the funnel of
doubt in Wittenberg et al. (1998) and Hancock, Wittenberg
et al. (2006, Figure 26) - the differences between low and
high base case projections for each type of model are much
greater than the differences in projections between models.
(The large number of independent models is not of rele-
vance for long-term care: it would be fanciful to imagine
more than one or a few for each country.) Such figures help
to focus discussion. Finance ministries would no doubt have
a concern for the costs to public funds and press for a solu-
tion with a probability of 90 per cent that it would not
exceed a certain proportion of the GDP, while consumer
interest groups would be interested inter alia in the thresh-
old benefit: cost ratio, and would press for parameterisation
of a model yielding not less than a 90 per cent probability
that those whose interests they promote would actually
receive benefits of at least a particular threshold level. 
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To conclude: great though the contributions of the WR
analysis are, it and others on which it draws rely too much
on early cost/time-limited evidence analysed. There are
implications 
• Social science sometimes needs ‘bigger’ (if certainly
anything but ‘big’) research by natural science
standards. Bigger research is risky and with long
collection periods and vast collection effort, of
apparently low productivity. Too often, it has paid
better to keep clear of it save as hitch-hiker. But it
can produce uniquely important evidence. 
• There should be more research collaborations across
disciplines and groups as long as much of the work is
integrated rather than in parallel. Disciplinary
associations can provide the frameworks for working
groups seeking to establish such work. The flexibility
demanded in such working should be better reflected
in education and training of researchers and the
courses and professional settings from which they are
recruited. Many would agree that the principles are
mainly honoured in the breach, suggesting that the
challenges to actual performance are not trivial. 
• Research funders can helpfully remember that one
quality that makes applied research reliable enough to
use is its theoretical strength, barely visible though
that may be to the research user. 
• The pressure group, manager or politician can
helpfully remind themselves that the useful generalities
are only likely to have the validity their plausibility
suggests when based on hard detailed work often
requiring technical skill and repeated and costly
collection and analysis of evidence. Academe must
assert the importance of time horizons and the time
and resources to think around issues and others must
not be so foolish as to denigrate it for doing so.
2.2. WR policy alternatives 
WR logic depended on analysis of the properties of types
at least as much as on the more detailed quantitative analy-
sis of exemplars. Would each possible member of a type
share the properties of evaluative significance to a greater
degree with other members of the type than with almost any
member of other types? Could it be that the properties for
types running in tandem – or hybrids – could be greatly
different? Would the partnership type be the best of those
so far considered whatever economic weather the changing
climate throws at us? Since the immediate future will be a
difficult to time to commit to a radical change – a low
maximum achievable allocation for public expenditure at
least in the near future; as always, a slower rate of change
in the capacity to cope of the kind of vulnerable people who
would be losers by the changes than optimists trying to
pursue new visions in the policy world assume; and like-
wise a slower and more geographically unequal pace of
adaptability of service commissioning and supply systems
– can we expect a better time later? If so, should we now
choose a second best solution, but one which will ease the
adoption of the partnership model later? 
Within- and between-type variations in model proper-
ties. No doubt, the Treasury-led committee to develop
alternatives are examining more variants within families,
though there is not yet a comparison and synthesis of the
pattern of outcomes from even from the published work.
There are questions galore to ask of the quantitative analy-
sis of the patterns. What WR-found patterns can be most
relied upon? There might be more sensitivity at the second
than at the first stage in the WR analyses, even of costs
and outcomes and their incidence. But it is difficult to
imagine that some key differences between the serious
contenders would be removed if the comparison was with
some new variant of a rival; other than a variant which is
so exotic as to resemble nothing seen in real life if only
because some of its special features would conflict too much
with the national values for that type to be chosen.22
Definitely the partnership model come what may? The
partnership model could work well for balance of ideas
about ends and means within the range of mainstream British
discourse, given time to adjust and some minimum of public
spending. A high enough level for the unmatched element
of the state contribution would virtually avoid losers. So
what the minimum would be would depend on the design
of the implementation plan, about which no clues are avail-
able. What factors would affect the minimum? Could the
policy system deliver that minimum? 
The capacity to cope of vulnerable people likely to lose
by model change is a factor suggesting that there exists a
minimum. Changes in expectations and capacities of succes-
sive cohorts to manage change are easy to over-estimate.
Circumstances making it more difficult to cope are well
established: many least affected by transformed life chances
and roles as proactive consumers; many with a lifetime
trapped by the absence of opportunities and skills, and have
family members who are similarly constrained; most at
high risk too old to be baby-boomers;23 many hit by health
accidents which at least for a considerable period greatly
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Figure 3: Probability distributions of an outcome given
probability-weighted scenario variations in each of a
variety of projection models; source: Meinshausen (2006)
in Stern (2007)21
limits their capacities to self-manage, often causing a gestalt
switch in assumption and morale to an expectation of decline
and death; many with debilitating clinical and sub-clinical
depression and cognitive impairment (Pavlou and Lachs,
2006). DH initiatives and CSCI policies developing more
detailed policy attempting to combine choice and empow-
erment with avoiding excessive danger and risk reflect
dilemmas more clearly than the policy papers stating policy
argument and proposals at their most general level (CSCI,
2006a, 2006b; DH, 200624).25
A slow and geographically uneven rate of adaptation
and effectiveness/efficiency improvement of local
commissioning and care systems would be a second factor
suggesting a minimum. The performance of the social care
system in England and Wales was in important respects
transformed during the decade between the late eighties
and nineties. Can the system respond as greatly to the
requirements of the policies in the green and white papers?
During the nineties there was in one respect a happy coin-
cidence of wants. Prioritising user independence in the
sense of enabling more users to be supported longer in
their own homes was something which managers at all
levels and field professionals could and did accept as the
highest priority (Davies and Challis, 2000) because it fitted
long-term aspirations and values of the social care paradigm,
and was mainly (not wholly) strengthened by incentives
from the financing arrangements after 1993.26
National priorities then changed. Coordination with health
services at various levels in Leutz’s (1999) typology became
the top priority. Rewards and sharp sanctions for adult
social care were made more dependent on performance
indicators of the social care contribution to achieving health
system priorities. Health care received large funding
increases while social care authorities continued to suffer
severe fiscal stress, though it was widely believed that
social care (home and community services as well as care
homes) was substantially reducing the demand for acute
beds.27 Unsurprisingly, the gap between some national
policy goals and the reality has seemed increasingly widen
as a result (McNally et al., 2003).28 For instance, the
proportion of areas in which only the two highest Fair
Access to Care Services (FACS) (DH, 2001) priority clas-
sification of cases actually received services was increasing
well before the most recent cuts (CSCI, 2006; Jones, 2006). 
The green paper (DH, 2005) reasserted and reworked retain-
able values and policy principles of the social care paradigm
while redefining it as part of a broader health and well being
paradigm. But it redefined the issues in a way which made
tackling them more complex at the same time as proclaim-
ing a context of changing expectations and – most directly
tackled by WR – a worsening resource balance. Re-engi-
neering and substitution were major themes, but its argument
was that to cope with the changed balance of demands and
public budgets, many of the substitutions would replace
resources financed from the adult social care budgets of
‘councils with responsibilities for social services’ [CSSRs]
by others; for instance by substituting universal services not
financed from the social care budget for mainstream social
care services, leveraging effort from the Voluntary and
Community Sector, and other sources of care in the commu-
nity. Directors of Adult Services were to play a leading role
in promoting ‘local wellbeing agenda’: a task whose precise
aims and form would vary greatly from place to place and
from time to time, including the quantitative precision of
links between means and ends. There were exhortations to
develop new forms of governance to match the need to
negotiate ends and means in the context of multiple inter-
ests and uncertainty. That is the Green Paper stressed the
development of interventions whose contexts would
necessarily make their creation and management generate
more ‘wicked’ issues than the mainstream services (Rittel
and Webber, 1973) more than, for instance, the white paper
of 1998, and to recommend governance arrangements
accordingly.29 The complexity and uncertainty of the
contexts and processes in which they would be established
and the novel elements in their inputs, logics, cultures and
prioritisation of effects, would create a low degree of tech-
nological determinacy at least until relationships and
understandings had been fully established and trust in their
continuation created. Experience has shown that when these
preconditions for achieving a practically useful degree of
technological determinacy are established at all, it usually
takes much longer than optimistic managers expect and
implicitly promise. 
Paradoxically, the Green Paper argued that the system
should also continue to cultivate the virtuous consequences
of using tools of which some assume a practically useful
degree of technological determinacy (Davies et al., 2000),
including what white papers called consistency (mentioned
in 1989 and a main theme in 1998). The reforms of the
period during which technological determinacy was most
emphasised certainly delivered the then prioritised goals
much more effectively by the later nineties. The propor-
tions of losses of some prioritised dimensions of welfare
predicted from risk factors were by then being offset by up
to a remarkable 25 per cent on average among users and
principal carers, and there were effects for a wide range of
the dimensions of evaluative importance in the social care
paradigm. 
The greater consistency in the relations between means and
ends by the late nineties sharpens the dilemmas of simul-
taneously pressing the exploitation of the benefits of
technological determinacy and increased reliance on new
‘wicked’ ways of producing welfare for which the uncer-
tainty of outcomes is great. The opportunity costs of relying
more on wicked ways have been increased by the greater
clarity and consensus about the prioritisation of goals, high
risk offset proportions, clearer patterns of service substi-
tution and complementarity, and the dependence of these
on user and carer circumstances. Greater losses of other
valued benefits than before would be caused by changing
the prioritisation of goals, particularly by giving the highest
priority to outcomes for which the relations between means
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and the end are unclear to the key field and lower manage-
ment actors.30 A more determinate technology and greater
consistency in its application imply less reducible ineffi-
ciency, and so larger opportunity costs if priorities are
changed or efficiency savings are imposed. That would be
still more powerfully the case if demand were diverted
from health to social care as the NHS is put under increas-
ing pressure during the coming CSR period, if more social
care resources were absorbed by NHS-led schemes with
different targeting priorities and objectives, and if the
resource balance in social care worsened. 
The dangers are obvious. Putting great effort and resources
into developing those new ways of tapping resources to
produce welfare which create the uncertainties and complex-
ities of policy areas which are wicked may distract councils
from achieving highly valued outcomes which have been
increasingly effectively delivered with policies based largely
on assuming a practically useful degree of technological
determinacy. It may be more difficult for CSCI’s succes-
sor to monitor commissioners and providers to the best
effect. Perhaps it would be safer to err towards minimis-
ing the reliance on wicked ways of producing welfare than
vice versa. 
Fortunately, most of the most important new ways need not
be wicked indefinitely, though conversion will require time,
effort and resources. The analyses which were the basis of
the concept of the ‘wicked problem’ distinguished between
contexts in which the wicked characteristics could be tempo-
rary from those in which wickedness was irredeemably
permanent (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Wood, 1944).31 But
conversion from wickedness will require the skilful, gradual,
committed, continuing and well-focused management of
change, supported by sufficient, well-grounded and contin-
uing investment in human, organisational and physical capital
and investment to create stability and trust, preconditions for
cooperation and collaboration between people and organisa-
tions.32 Perhaps then in the longer run the forms of
intervention which are by nature irredeemably wicked will
consume too low a proportion of the resources for their oppor-
tunity costs massively to reduce welfare. It is in that longer
run that the demands for public financing will be greatest. 
Could it be that making this optimistic scenario a reality
could be helped by processes parallel to those observed in
the urban regeneration programme (Whitehead, 2007)? The
WR findings are key for putting the issues into perspec-
tive. The Green Paper developed the substitution and
innovation argument substantially because without such
substitutions and innovation, likely public funding would be
insufficient to meet the demands with the then policies. A
systematic shift in resources substantially reducing the vast
underfunding shown by the WR in time to contribute when
the innovations are at their most technologically indeter-
minate could transform the degree to which ambitions could
be achieved in the long run. 
What then is the lowest WR threshold which would keep
down the collateral damage of the most vulnerable losers
to an acceptable degree? WR estimates suggest under-
spending on social care compared with the NHS by
approximately one fifth if the threshold is set in terms of
core personal care business alone, two fifths including well-
being. And budgeting makes no allowance for transitional
costs. Only modelling of costs and the value of outcomes
with allowance for transitional costs given realistic assump-
tions about the kinds of difficulty discussed above could give
a quantitative feel for the answer. Presumably this is a
focus of the activity of the Treasury-led team. 
How likely is it that the government will deliver the
minimum in the medium term? The room for manoeuvre
in the triennium of the CSR08 (Comprehensive Spending
Review) is presumably strictly limited, whatever the
marginal rates of return on different forms of spending.
What effort should government make in the longer run? The
focus should be on the health vote and on the transfer of
Attendance and Disability Living allowances from the social
security budget. 
The latter is easier to discuss partly for the bad reason that
we have less knowledge on which to base estimates of the
opportunity costs in terms of lost welfare of reducing these
benefits. Would it be fair to apply to those British benefits
the same scepticism about their impacts on our prioritised
subtle but well-defined British social care outcomes as we
apply to the German benefit in cash because government
until recently has not demanded to know? The evidence is
old and slight. Davies, Fernandez and Saunders (1998) did
not find that Attendance Allowance receipt reduced the
probability of admission to institutions for long-term care
during the eighties. They estimated that the French ACTP
was more successful. WR reasonably bases its suggestions
on what is known. In several OECD countries disability and
related policy areas are in question. And some of these are
not traditionally tied in level and eligibility to the other
elements in the wider social security system. It is difficult
to deny the WR argument that substantial redistribution to
the social care budget would add to the sum of human
welfare, as indeed was suggested thirty years ago (Davies
and Challis, 1986). But there should surely be transitional
compensation for the losers, and the many who will be
unable to adjust without great loss of welfare because of
the nature of their disabilities – many more than the most
obvious examples like socially isolated victims of autism
with personality difficulties and substantial learning diffi-
culties, for instance. Those transitional arrangements should
continue over an indefinite period in the absence of a more
efficient and welfare-improving alternative. 
WR creates an extremely strong case about the direction,
and order of magnitude for the redistribution from health
votes that would maximise welfare. Highly respected
experts suspect there to be little evidence that there is
anything like the same marginal rate of return being
achieved in many areas of the NHS. However, NICE
recommendations have so far affected only a very small
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percentage of the total NHS spend. Appleby (2007,
p.50) argues that such evaluation should be carried out
‘at another level’ than NICE precisely in order to
contribute to setting limits on NHS budgets, a theme
parallel with that of the paper by Kind and Williams
(2004). Appleby suggests that ‘from the limited data that
does exist, it is hard to demonstrate that the NHS is on
the steepest part of the curve where the health returns
from additional spending are high. In no area among
those reviewed are there major identifiable health gains
that can be attributed to extra health spending alone.
This is even true of the diseases such as cancer and
coronary heart disease (CHD) on which the government
has focused extra resources . . . Gains are being achieved
in such areas as convenience and process benefits (for
example, the changes that have led to shorter waiting
times within hospital accident and emergency depart-
ments). Some of these may lead to better health
outcomes, but the main argument used by the govern-
ment for setting targets such as these derives from the
perception that ‘expectations’ of service performance are
rising and that people want choice of when and where
to be treated and easier access to whatever services they
choose . . . While this is intuitively convincing, in fact
there is very little hard evidence about the value placed
on benefits of these kinds, nor indeed of the costs of
providing these benefits’ (Appleby, 2007, p.53). That is,
the gains are more comparable with the wellbeing and
morale gains from social care quality of life, but unlike
the gains from additional social care, at the margin they
are probably are likely to be at much higher cost than
the NICE threshold. 
So in a rational and just world, the minimum would be
provided, even if not immediately. But it is one thing to
speak truth to power, another for power so much as to
acknowledge it, and yet another for government to act to
remedy the inequity and inefficiency. The low expected
increase in the adult social care budget for the CSR08 trien-
nium has been repeatedly proclaimed. With a low CSR
settlement not just for this but for subsequent triennia, the
partnership model would have to be designed to incorpo-
rate an extremely high incremental benefit/cost ratio, a very
low proportions of that set as the limit for the state enti-
tlement, and/or a low state match to consumer payments.
Given the threshold, the lower the state entitlement, and the
lower the State match, the bigger the gap left to be covered
by co-payments. 
As a contingency plan, should we envisage garnering
whatever additional budget is available for less costly
attempts to soften the edges of the means-tested system
during the medium term? There is a historical precedent.
After all, except for shifting skilled nursing care to the NHS,
making incremental changes to the system was how the
government acted in response to the Royal Commission
report of 1999 (DH, 2000). The literature has already
explored various combinations of changing upper and lower
limits of capital disregards and of income for either or both
residential or home care, reducing the tariff rate, or abol-
ishing the assets element (JRF, 2006; Hirsch, 2005;
Hancock, Wittenberg et al., 2006; Royal Commission,
1999, pp.58–62). 
How long would the medium run last? Certainly longer than
one or two CSR triennia. Space does not allow an analy-
sis of factors influencing its duration. Since the key
constraint is surely what level of public spending will be
forthcoming, the key precondition for a successful bid will
be what growth in per capita GDP will follow from our
performance in the global economy. For what it is worth,
not until between 2035 and 2040 are the total and old age
dependency ratios projected to stabilise.33 Hancock,
Wittenberg et al. (2006, Table 6) projections until 2051 of
the demands and supply of long-term care of older people
(with current policies) suggest diminishing rates of growth
of public spending decade on decade after 2012, with a
decline in the percentage increase by 20 per cent during the
decade beginning in 2041. The pattern may not be very
different for several model types. Radical change would still
be an expensive undertaking, slightly less to the degree
that the means-testing model were upgraded in the interim.
Perhaps the conclusion is that there will not be an ideal
period for a change to a model shifting responsibilities to
the state unless the long run is defined so as to satisfy
Keynes’ observation that it is the period in which we are
all dead.34
The focus of WR was selecting main funding mechanisms.
Whatever is chosen will create opportunities for ‘niche’
models to make a contribution when policy is sufficiently
in place to create a more stable policy environment. It will
then be important for the State to identify and publicise
market failures, by that means helping to spot niches for
which supplementary models would be useful. Government
should publish its appraisal of proposals like that reported
in WR by Kent County Council to continue work on the
BRITSMO model (Davies and Challis, 1986) for which
support in experimental implementation was first recom-
mended in the Griffiths Report in 1987 (Griffiths, 1987;
Wanless et al., 2006, pp. 246–250).
3. Conclusions 
WR has provided England with a clear direction for policy
development based on evidence about what could most equi-
tably and efficiently produce the benefits sought by means
of long-term care policy. In the new real economy of care
produced in the nineties, attempts to cope with additional
demand and to increase quality will require higher spend-
ing because much of the system’s inefficiency has been
squeezed out by years of lower rates of increase in social
care spending in relation to demands and relative price
effects. Without the higher spending, even arguably effi-
ciency-improving innovations would be financed largely by
robbing Peter to pay Paul. 
WR results confirm large under-funding of this Cinderella
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of the DH family. The WR estimates carry all the more
conviction because they applied conservative assumptions:
the low ceiling spend per ADLAY compared with actual
NICE practice as described by its chair, the calculation of
under-funding by approximately one fifth for a narrow ‘core
business’ concept of outcomes, much larger assuming a
concept including wellbeing effects. This underfunding has
been long and often argued from other evidence. The under-
funding worsened during most of the reform period. It
distorted the implementation of key policies, particularly in
care management and service commissioning and develop-
ment, seriously weakening the outcome-affecting processes
on whose outcome effects the logic of the reforms was
argued. The continuation of gross underfunding would
similarly distort and weaken the outcome-producing process
and practice of the new models promoted in current
policy – particularly for the outcomes prioritised through-
out the period, because the earlier models were designed
exclusively for their production, the new models being little
different in their values and arrangements for producing
those outcomes but adding new and often conflicting
objectives. 
Several things would help the policy process to correct the
under-funding. 
One is to continue and involve more people and groups in
policy debate making use of the Wanless framework and
the type of evidence it uses. It requires that more of the
interested parties should tool themselves to participate in
its deepening and development. That would help to create
a coincidence between spending allocations which would
best improve human welfare and those which would most
gain electoral support. It would substantially reduce the
undue influence of established but partially erroneous
assumptions, unbalanced formulations of issues and argu-
ments, and so in effect the interests of some actors and
groups. 
A second is to ensure the continuing influence of the social
care paradigm with field reorganisations and the amalga-
mation of the agencies for quality assurance and
improvement for health and social care. The national quality
improvement body has a degree of constitutional inde-
pendence of the day to day pressures on the politicians and
the executive. The danger most discussed in the international
literature is ‘capture’: excessively frequent surrender to
external interests in the effort to contribute to consensus.35
Reorganisation at the field level has tended to place those
most influenced by the social care paradigm into the organ-
isational authority structures of paradigms dominated by
other ends and means. When circumstances are difficult,
outright confrontation with the strong may not seem to
them to be the most effective way to make what limited
progress may be possible. 
A third is to ensure that the policy of devolution to lower
level governments and independent agencies, and extend-
ing citizen empowerment in return for risk and
responsibility, is accompanied by increasingly extensive
and rigorous evaluation. WR illustrates how powerful can
be the evidence produced from it. But again there is a
danger of capture when such a high proportion of the money
for big and continuing research collections and analysis on
long-term care is provided by such few sources. If so, can
we envisage creating institutional arrangements which would
reduce it? The question has been put many times before and
will no doubt be put many times in the future. 
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Notes
1 It reflects the development of the interpretation of one use of the
concept ‘need’ as equitable and efficient allocation. Feldstein
(1963) wrote that the many advocated ‘meeting needs’ when ‘it
would make for clearer analysis if they talked about “optimising
the use of resources”’. During the seventies, York economists
led and others followed in developing the cost-benefit concept of
need (Culyer, Lavers, and Williams, 1971), a step in the
development of what Culyer (2006) identifies as a theme in the
development of ‘extra-welfarist’ theory better fitted to inform
policy-makers than the more reductionist approaches in
theoretical welfare economics (Culyer, 2006). A stream of
papers followed using the cost-benefit concept to analyse policy
argument, the rationale of methodologies for developing social
indicators, and structures and processes by which resources were
allocated using concepts like the policy paradigm. For instance,
Williams (1974, p.65) used it to dismiss its then common use as
what he called ‘need as quasi-supply concept’ where ‘need’ was
defined as existing over the whole range of marginal
productivities between the current level of welfare and the point
at which they ceased add to the value of outputs because, first,
that led to an overstatement of under-funding – and, secondly,
not there argued, for different outcomes, the ratio of areas under
the productivity curves in the range between the actual level and
the optimal need threshold on the one hand to the area in the
range from the optimal threshold to the top of the curve on the
other, is likely to differ greatly between commodities, thus
biasing estimation if the quasi-supply concept were the basis of
indicators in models; Davies (1974) applied the cost-benefit need
concept in conditions 
of technical determinacy to the design of indicators in the context
of the theory of standards-setting and to the measurement of
need as welfare shortfall defined in relation to the cost-benefit
need threshold, the range which Netten et al. (2005) define as
measuring a concept aking to Sen’s capability; Davies (1975a;
1977a) applied it to the discussion of needs indicators implicit in
policy paradigms as one element in the theory of variations in
local policy outputs; Davies (1976a, b) to the rationale for a new
design for need-compensating central government grants to local
authorities; Davies (1977b) to the discussion of its relevance to
the empirical measurement and valuation of outcomes and
production function studies using techniques applied in transport
studies and studies using a human capital theory framework; and
Davies (1985) the different weighting of dimensions for
aggregating data into an indicator of supply-side non-resource
inputs (weightings to leave outputs unchanged) and into an
indicator of outcomes (valuation weights for the range between
the observed and threshold cost-benefit need level). 
2 The analysis depends on a classification of ‘services’ assumed to
have the same balance of content across local systems save to the
degree that differences are controlled for by other variables in
the estimation models. For practical purposes of interpretation
and application, the assumption is that differences in content
between systems in each ‘service’ are small compared with
differences between services. Of course, as such studies have
long emphasised and as national policy has increasingly pressed,
it is important to engineer services around local system contexts.
Models for areas whose services have different contents would of
course have different classifications of services, and yield at least
slightly different patterns of substitution, complementarity,
economies of scale, etc.; that is models must be interpreted in
the context of their purpose and geographical scope. 
3 Situations with linear relationships were often characterised by a
scarcity of the service in question: less of the service with
constrained supply was consumed than would have been desired
or would have been efficient. 
4 See Davies, Fernandez, and Nomer (2000) for such equation
forms. To estimate the substitution and complementarity effects,
it is necessary for the outcome indicators to be general to all
inputs. If the raw information ties the outcome to each individual
indicator separately – frequently done in all countries, the sum
of the effects will exceed the true overall effect. Also the
outcome variables for each domain must include questions
worded to make it clear to users, carers and other respondents
that what is being asked about are the overall effects of services,
as well as questions about achieving service goals and process
quality narrowly defined. 
5 Particularly 
– The ‘productivities’ of services are highly contingent on risk
factors and other circumstances. We discuss the effects of low
morale and its correlates below. Low morale is associated with
greater disability, so that failure to allow adequately for it can
yield what are oxymoronic negative estimates of marginal
productivities or costs in conditions of tight service rationing. 
– Most services affect several outcome dimensions but to
different degrees, with the impacts depending on the mix of
inputs and outcomes and supply side factors. Therefore it is
key for efficiency and effectiveness to mix services in a way
which best exploits the relationship between service
productivities and service prices (or marginal costs) given the
other factors. 
– Levels of one outcome affect the ‘marginal productivities’ of
services in the production of other outcomes. For instance,
morale and depression at sub-clinical as well as clinical levels
affect the costs of improving other care outcomes by
whomsoever rated. In part, this is because users and carers
themselves necessarily ‘co-produce’ some outcomes and can
contribute to the co-production of others, and do so less if
paralysed by low morale or clinical depression. Also some
outcomes are user or carer perceptions, and the effects of low
morale should be included. 
6 The WR production function for it, estimated from ECCEP data,
predicted the service inputs required to bring the perceived
burden of caring of principal informal caregivers down to a
threshold level established by mapping onto the ECCEP’s main
indicator of carer burden a threshold from another ECCEP
indicator for which an appropriate threshold had been established
in the American literature. The ECCEP project included triadic
design elements for the collection of data for users, principal
informal caregivers and care managers, thus permitting analysis
of the interdependence of utility functions and of differences in
perception of situations and outcomes. 
7 OPUS was the product of government-sponsored research. It
worked to, and was helped by a reference group who usefully
reflected the dilemmas of policy and practice affecting resource
allocation at the time. Central government officials and local
managers were powerfully represented on the reference group.
Their experience and views were powerfully reflected in the
domain structure and the wording of instruments. 
8 Morale change (and associated indicators) were used as an
outcome in some streams of the British literature since Mattilda
Goldberg’s path-breaking experiment (1970), and indicators for
much the same domain were used in major American
experiments like channelling (Wooldridge et al 1986). 
9 Examples are the influence of reduced carer stress on reducing
the marginal cost of extending user stays at home and improving
user satisfaction with services, and substantial levels of ROPPs
(Risk Offset Proportion from Productivity effects, measuring the
proportion of the predicted effects of risk factors offset by
service inputs; Davies et al., 2000, p.170) for indicators of
reduced felt burden of caregiving and improved locus of control
among users of 25 per cent and affecting 90 per cent of carers,
improved satisfaction with life development (18 per cent
affecting 40 per cent of users), and the general Philadelphia
Geriatric Center morale scale (Lawton, 1975), 12 per cent and
72 per cent (Davies, Fernandez, and Nomer, 2000, Figures 11.2
and 12.1). Social care inputs clearly increased morale and related
variables for substantial proportions of users – just as they
improved users’ feelings of empowerment over their own life,
‘locus of control’ (24 and 54 per cent). 
10 It will be remembered that the rate of diversion of more disabled
users to social from health care accelerated from the end of the
decade. National government set performance targets in ways
which focused social care more on a narrower (and different)
clientele in seeking to prioritise the reduction of demands on
acute beds and aspects of need traditionally the foci of health
care: not the imposition of the ‘medical model’, but an important
refocusing away from some core elements of the social care
paradigm and its outcome and targeting priorities nonetheless.
Fiscal pressure continues. One reason is that the new health-
orientated priorities for the social care services, including
servicing new branches of NHS-led community activities for
health policy purposes, have to be financed from social service
budgets which are only modestly growing. Local authorities have
been complaining about the difference in growth rates between
social care and NHS expenditures. ‘Support for services such as
social care through the general grant has increased by just 14 per
cent in real terms since 1997/98. This is in stark contrast to the
NHS, which has seen a 90 per cent rise over the same period.
Half of local authorities with social care responsibilities received
a government grant increase below inflation this year’ (LGA,
2006). The LGA survey of February 2007 again raised the
consequences of NHS resource pressures for cost-shunting to
social care, though suggesting that a lower proportion of
authorities were intending (or contemplating) a step change
between FACS levels in the minimum eligibility criterion,
though substantial proportions suggesting other effects which
would reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of service,
including diminished preventive effects (LGA, 2007). 
11 In response to the LGA finance survey in March 2006, 77 per
cent of the respondents suggested that they would raise the
eligibility floor during the coming year. Carson (2006) reported
that one third of the councils responding to a Counsel and Care
survey had tightened eligibility criteria in the past year and two-
thirds now only offer care to older people with ‘critical’ and
‘substantial’ risk levels. It was reported that Hampshire planned
to raise the threshold to the topmost (‘critical’ risk) level of the
fourfold FACS classification. 
12 Central government promoted a new priority to wellbeing as an
outcome in Modernising Local Government (1998), which
proposed a duty ‘to promote economic social and environmental
wellbeing (para. 8.8) to be supported by a ‘discretionary power
to enable councils to take steps which will promote the wellbeing
of their area and those who live in it . . . provided that’ their
policies would not prejudice the performance of other functions
and those of other statutory agencies (para. 8.11). The logic was
reflected in the Better Government for Older People initiative,
and later in the 2005 green paper. 
13 For Interferon, it was estimated to be ‘up to £900,000’ per
QALY. 
14 The issue arises irrespective of how the eligibility for NHS
continuing care funding is defined, because there can be
conditions in which the victim consumes no health resources. 
15 Variety was sought with respect to eight characteristics, two in
particular: the degree of risk pooling (and so risk reduction and
cost), and the balance of State and individual responsibility.
Other characteristics were the balance between entitlement and
budget dominance; degree of redistribution; indemnity benefit
versus needs-meeting; national or local determination of benefit
levels and eligibility criteria; citizen choice of contribution and
benefit levels; reliance on informal care. 
16 One feature which at first sight seemed attractive was the
national standardisation, simplicity, transparency, and so greater
comprehensibility to citizens and beneficiaries/users of eligibility
criteria and their relationship to levels of benefit in cash or kind.
However, the subsequent development of some of the models
seems to be weakening precisely these elements to some degree
in the pursuit of new effectiveness and efficiency goals. For
instance, Dutch legislation in 1986 signals the abandonment of
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the AWBZ insurance mechanism, creating municipally subsidised
and managed models. Reacting to dissatisfaction with the way
the new system was working, and in particular to inadequate
case management and the supply side unresponsiveness to users’
wishes to which some partly attributed the fact that a high
proportion of users chose cash not services, the Germans
launched a major multi-site demonstration of a model in which
the entitlement is viewed as a ‘person-bound’ (individual) budget
with a professional case manager to help beneficiaries make their
choices of provision, and also coordinate with medical care,
increasing the likelihood of producing more welfare with the
resources by taking into account a wider and more subtle range
of circumstances and preferences, so lessening the clumsiness of
the social insurance arrangement by which benefits based on
crude individual and straightforward criteria are used in a user-
unresponsive system of provision. Whereas, early French
discourse had been substantially in the language of insurance -
‘fourth social risk’ and other metaphors, building on a standard
national evaluation instrument, with almost complete reliance
(for needs assessment) on the standard national tool, the AGGIR,
in the second and third stages of development from the use of
the disability benefit, the Allocation Compensatrice pour Tièrce
Personne, to a benefit for older people culminating with the
introduction of the Allocation Personnalisée d’Autonomie
likewise introduced assessment and care management by multi-
disciplinary teams (Davies, Fernandez, and Saunders’ 1988; le
Bihan and Martin, 2006). What was interesting about German
long-term care insurance was that it introduced benefits in kind
into an insurance framework with its assumptions that benefits
would be in cash. (Appropriate for their argument, some Anglo-
Saxon observers instead treated payment of the benefit in cash as
being what was interesting.) France too shifted some way from
the focus on cash benefits. The influential sociologist Claudine
Attias-Donfut had criticized the system thus: ‘il y une conception
très individualiste de la protection sociale. On aide des individus
isolés, indépendamment de leurs contextes’. Indeed, a French
historian of the process (writing for French readers) summed up
the French development as a shift from benefits in cash to
services in kind matching resources to needs; ‘The abandonment
of prêt-à-porter for tailored benefits’ (Frinault, 2005). Secondly,
as experience has accumulated, it became evident that
transparency carried with it the disadvantages accompanying
simplicity and inflexibility of contributions and benefit structures
and inflexibility of the regulatory structure. That made it more
difficult to maintain effectiveness efficiency and equity by other
criteria as the balance of pressures of demands and resources
worsened. The political difficulties in raising more contributions
(particularly from employers) in Germany caused benefits to lag
increasingly behind costs, causing increasing recourse to the
means-tested social assistance again, the escape from which for
users and for the sub-national funding bodies alike was a major
impetus for the introduction of long term care insurance. In
Japan, a similar situation was responded to by changes in
eligibility rules removing a substantial proportion of those who
would previously have been eligible, and by the introduction of
user co-payments for hotel costs in care homes (Ikegami, 2007).
A priori, it seems more difficult to achieve effectiveness, equity
and efficiency by the key outcome criteria of the social care
paradigm, as reflected for instance in the new WR criterion,
with a social insurance philosophy aimed to provide a
contingency benefit to cover crude risk factors than with some of
the alternative models.
17 For instance, already Ryan et al. (2006) have shown that there
are associations with routine variables like age, living
circumstances, and reporting both some impairment and currently
receiving services. People aged 85 and over were more
concerned about food and nutrition and less concerned about
social contact than younger recipients. Disabled people in receipt
of services ranked food and nutrition highest, followed by social
participation. (See Table 5.7) As they stand, these patterns are
Rorschag tests. The literature on valuation illustrates many
interpretations with quite different practical implications for the
analysis. Progress depends on teasing them out. 
18 More work is needed to investigate the most appropriate ways to
investigate differences in perceptions, to incorporate objective
risks and sense of safety and to identify utility weights with
nationally representative samples. Specific investigations into
groups of interest, such as ethnic minorities, would also both
potentially provide alternative utility indexes reflecting the
perspectives of these groups. 
19 That creates problems of interpretation. For some it is because
of the probability of cognitive dissonance among people
responding to great distress, adjustment of their reference group
to those with similar need-related circumstances, or other forms
of psychological adaptation to cope with their situation. For
others, it is that they are being asked to evaluate purely
hypothetical situations whose effects they cannot easily envisage.
Opinion differs whether valuation compression (by which those
with experience give responses which distinguish between levels
of unmet need less – in this study case, to a degree sufficient to
remove statistical significance in some analyses) makes the
valuations of the experienced more or less valid than the
weightings of others. Perhaps the judgment must depend on
whether it is the users’ own psychological interpretation which
should count the most. If so, there is a double danger that the
estimates may exaggerate the value of meeting unmet needs: first
the estimates are based on willingness to spend rather than
willingness to pay, and secondly, because the value weights are
more heavily weighted with the perceptions of the general
population than of service recipients. These influences from all
levels of illumination and irrationality down to the sub-conscious
influence individuals to differing degrees. Most perhaps are to
some degree potentially predictable from other data, so
eventually allowing the correction of the resulting biases in
estimates to a practically useful degree. They usefully warn the
reductive modeller against the hubris of imagining that all the
precise calculations provide are crude orders of magnitude and
monochrome sketches of complex polychrome patterns. 
20 One reason for the insistence of the designers of the projection
models from their earliest publications that it should be focused
primarily on examining the sensitivity of outcomes to scenario
variations, however inevitable the reliance of the policy world on
its best guess case projections. See Wittenberg et al. (1998). 
21 Reproduced under PCI license no.C2007000684. 
22 For instance, Hancock and Wittenberg (2006, tables 8 and 15)
illustrate how the incidence on public and private expenditure
can vary almost as greatly between current and the alternative
reforms of asset means tests investigated as between current
means tests and three variants of free personal care. But with the
free personal care options, the share of public spending is in all
versions lower, and the differences established early are
projected to be continued in the long run to 2051. Another
example: tipping the balance towards more formulaically
weighted allocation judgments based on general risk factor into
broad levels of care (as with social insurance) between now and
mid-century rather than towards allocation by a wide range of
factors, some complex and subjective, evaluated and weighted in
a context-sensitive judgment within broad guidelines (closer to
the Single Assessment Process philosophy) is likely to have more
certain effects on the distribution of welfare than projections for
2051 from alternative variants of our current funding model. 
23 Someone borne in 1946 will not reach eighty until the end of the
WR time horizon, almost twenty years hence. 
24 For instance, with respect to self-assessment and the allocation
of a provisional budget for self-administration, a key aspect of
one model of the commendable individual budgets model:
‘Enabling individuals to self-assess the threats to their own
independence/health is a complicated issue as there are potential
risks around inappropriate service delivery and failure to identify
some needs. . . . However, we believe that there are probably
areas where self-assessment could be used, for example in
assessments for some items of low-level, community equipment
and for other low-level services’ (DH 2006, p.38). 
25 Response to risk of diswelfares of various kinds is core to the
language and logic of the Fair Access policy for eligibility
determination and prioritisation: allocations to the four bands
being based on the ‘seriousness of the risk to independence or
other consequences if needs are not addressed’ (DH, 2003a,
2003b), and establishing this risk can require professional
interpretation of the situation: ‘needs assessment and risk
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evaluation rely for their quality on person-centred conversations
with individuals seeking help carried out by competent
professionals prepared to exercise their judgment . . .
Frameworks, case examples and the like can only ever support
the exercise of person-centred, competent judgment (DH,
2003b). Although some documents for models which require
self-management and risk tend to contain little discussion about
how hard it is to handle the dilemmas, scoring systems in self-
assessment forms give heavy weights to safety and risk domains
(Duffy and Waters, 2005; In Control, 2005), and some leading
the implementation of the models have argued the importance of
adapting policy and practice to recognise the dilemmas: ‘there is
a risk that a focus on enabling disabled people will lead to
services failing to identify those individuals where it is genuinely
too risky to hand over leadership to the person. There will need
to be a much greater onus on human services identifying people
at risk and authorising named individuals to take responsibility
for their services. At the moment the presumption of provider
control masks the possible options available, but there will be no
room for uncertainty in systems that seek to minimise central
control’ (Duffy, 2004). 
26 The remarkable correspondence of rankings by workers at all
levels in authorities and this top national priority was described
in Davies and Fernandez (2000). Restoring the bulk of the costs
of the public subsidisation of care home costs to the social care
budget created the conditions for the generalisation of what were
becoming the policies of leading authorities before the budgetary
responsibility was in effect transferred by the creation of the
Board and Lodging Allowance in 1980. So the development of
alternatives to residential care in the new policy logic of 1989
fitted the dominant values at all levels and in most groups in
social services departments. After a first year of relative plenty
in 1993, the growth of demand in excess of public budgets
sharpened the incentives both to find less costly home care
alternatives, and also to strike hard bargains with home care
providers – leading eventually to under-supply and pressure on
quality, as the theory of the nursing home market of the eighties
predicted (Davies, 1986, 1989; Davies and Knapp, 1988). 
27 The evaluation of a vaunted NHS nursing-led model, Evercare,
the model from which the community matron stream of NHS
schemes was to descend, had little if any effect on what it was
designed to produce, diversion of demand from acute beds
(Boaden et al., 2005; 2006). In contrast, estimates of the effects
of inter-personal variations in utilisation of home and community
services suggested that home care had large effects on the
utilisation of acute beds over a period of two years (Fernandez
and Davies, 2004). Perhaps the excess demand for acute beds
have been reduced more had the money been spent by the social
services departments on the users they would anyhow have
targeted (Fernandez and Forder, 2007 forthcoming). 
28 That is illustrated by their account of pressure at the front line:
‘our research [in three areas] points to a Catch 22 situation . . .
[there is] so much incoming work that social services
practitioners (as lead agents . . .) have often struggled to take any
single referral beyond the initial stages of assessment and care
planning. On the other hand, the inability first to integrate the
monitoring and review stages and second to provide a
comprehensive, multi-disciplinary approach (where appropriate)
almost certainly helps explain the very high re-referral rates and
subsequent work overload. This suggests that focusing on
procedures for joint working and honing the existing system, as
advocated in the single assessment guidance, will not address the
root cause of the problem. This lies in case loads which demand
the processing of clients and patients as quickly and efficiently as
possible and overstretched practitioners who simply do not have
time to act as ‘care managers’ coordinating care and the various
‘specialist assessments’ of other agencies and professionals. As
noted earlier, social services departments are often expected to
operate increasingly close to breaking point.’ Of course, there
has always been great variation – and volatility, for instance in
response to budget changes in related agencies and changes in
grant settlements – in the balance between needs and resources at
the local level, but it is likely that this has been and remains a
fair picture of the situation of a substantial proportion of field
areas at any time (McNally et al., 2003, pp.21–2). See also
Sinclair et al., 1998. 
29 Ritter and Webber argued that the planning context in which they
invented the concept of wickedness was characterised by extreme
technological indeterminacy – social heterogeneity is
incompatible great precision of goals, causality is unclear and so
therefore are the means to achieve goals, 
30 The most highly prioritised goals have been shifted from some
which are well culturally embedded and so pursued with little
prompting by all participants and structurally embedded in field
organisations dominated by them, to goals which are less directly
open to social care influence increasingly in field settings
requiring accommodation to culturally alien values and
assumptions about ends and means. That is likely to weaken
consistency in the relations between resources and outcomes. 
31 Indeed, there seems to have been a tendency among both policy-
makers and academics to have a preoccupation with ‘wickedness’
that would do justice to the devout Massachusetts colonists: to
perceive and pursue it in policy contexts whose symptoms of
wickedness and its causes pale into insignificance compared with
the policy areas for which the wickedness argument was
originally developed. That may have both led to misleading
policy judgment and to the unintended creation of alibis for
under-performance. For instance, more welfare may be produced
if the context is acted upon as if it is substantially
technologically determinate than technologically indeterminate
when there is the evidence that it is the former to a practically
useful degree. 
32 The great diversion of resources and attention to improving the
integration of health and social care had only mixed success
partly because assumptions about time and other preconditions
were too optimistic, the literature suggests. In some cases, like
some of the NHS-led models seeking to reduce acute bed use
among those at high risk using considerable amounts of spending
on social services for older people by CSSRs, it will also require
more effective learning from the experience from CSSR
experience of care management. 
33 The older population is projected to be much more evenly
distributed across the age range. Therefore there will be higher
proportions in the older age group in 2051, with an increase of
two thirds or more in the number of persons aged 85 and over
during the previous two decades (DWP, 2004; Turner, 2004). 
34 Funding reforms were among those advocated for the period
when the window of opportunity was last open, the nineties. The
OECD projected that continuation of the whole range of current
public policies would actually reduce public spending by 2 per
cent over the decade. An academic suggested: ‘failure to find the
resources to make the investment could be . . . an opportunity to
improve the quality of our national life permanently lost’ (Davies
et al., 1990, pp.399; OECD, 1988). Policy makers had an alibi:
as in several other countries, they were too busy developing and
managing reforms to tackle issues with which the policy world is
most familiar and for which it can most readily put tools in
place, only later engaging other issues, often by modifying the
newly created mechanisms: in the British case, supply side
reforms; in the German and Japanese, a social insurance funding
mechanism. It can be debated whether an important opportunity
was lost by not also experimenting with models incorporating
innovations in financing mechanisms with feature to improve
equity, effectiveness and efficiency in the publicly subsidized
real economy of care.
35 In its official response to the DH consultation on its plans to
merge the quality assurance regulators for health and social care,
the CSCI suggested that the new remit was so broad that care
would have to be taken to ensure health issues did not dominate
official focus (Care and Health News, 2007). The announcement
was made by Gordon Brown ahead of the 2005 election in the
context of his battle to reduce red tape.
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During a decade of debate on how best to fund long-term
care, British analysts have focused more on policy devel-
opments in other countries than ever before. Discussing
criteria for appraising options, the paper argues that the
objectives of the financing system must be considered in
the light of the objectives for the long-term care system
as a whole. The types of funding mechanisms discussed
are private insurance, including private/public partner-
ships, tax-funded and social insurance models. The
differences between tax-funded and social insurance models
are discussed. Social insurance with hypothecation of funds
is no longer part of the current debate, which now focuses
on the three types of options whose properties are
described in the paper: free personal care (adopted in
Scotland), the retention of means-tested arrangements in
some form, and a partnership model as recommended in
the Wanless report. The paper agrees with the Wanless
Report that all three have strengths and weaknesses.
Decision-makers have a window of opportunity to make
reforms before the baby-boomers reach late old age.
Introduction
The recent report (Wanless et al., 2006) has re-kindled the
debate about the financing of long-term care in England.
The debate started to smoulder before the establishment of
the Royal Commission on Long Term Care (Royal
Commission, 1999) and much more visibly since the publi-
cation of its report and of the Government response
(Secretary of State for Health, 2000). The key issue has
been who is eligible for what publicly funded care and with
what user contributions if any. Underlying the debate are
concerns both about the future affordability of long-term
care and about the fairness of the current funding system.
The debate has sharpened the criteria for the evaluation of
funding systems and mobilised evidence about a wider range
of policy options. 
The Royal Commission’s key recommendation was that the
nursing and personal care components of the fees of care
homes and home-based personal care should be met by the
state, without a means test, and financed out of general taxa-
tion (Royal Commission, 1999). Means-testing would
remain for the accommodation and ordinary living costs
(‘hotel’ costs) covered by residential fees and for help with
domestic tasks. The Government accepted many of the
Royal Commission’s recommendations but only removed the
means test for nursing care in nursing homes (Secretary of
State for Health, 2000). Similar decisions were adopted by
the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland
Assembly. The Scottish Executive, however, decided that
it would make personal care free of charge as well (Care
Development Group, 2001). 
The debate on how best to fund long-term care has contin-
ued. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) has suggested
a number of ways in which the funding system could be
improved (JRF, 2006; Hirsch, 2005) and the Wanless Social
Care Review has proposed a partnership arrangement
(Wanless et al., 2006). The JRF and Wanless proposals are
both based on analyses of long-term care systems interna-
tionally (Glendinning et al., 2004; Poole, 2006), with an
awareness that “other countries have taken major steps to
secure sustainable and stable funding systems” (JRF, 2006,
p.2). British analysts have become more interested in policy
developments in other countries than ever before.
Criteria for Appraising Options
The purpose of long-term care provision is to promote the
welfare of users and carers, including outcomes such as
improved health, improved quality of life, making a posi-
tive contribution, exercise of choice and control, freedom
from discrimination or harassment, economic well-being,
personal dignity (Department of Health, 2005; 2006). These
are broad well-being goals, which can be regarded as
outcomes-based objectives for the Welfare State more gener-
ally. Financing long-term care needs to seen the context of
wider developments in the Welfare State, particularly family
policies, as so much care is provided by unpaid carers,
health care policies and pensions policies. 
The function of financing mechanisms is to contribute to
the achievement of policy goals using the means and accept-
ing the constraints prescribed by policy. The objectives of
the financing system need, therefore, to be considered in
the context of the objectives of the whole long-term care
system. The overall system covers ways in which revenues
are raised to fund care and ways in which those revenues
are allocated to service users. The former include the
balance between private and public sources of funding and
between different public sources of funding. The latter
include eligibility criteria, patterns of care and the balance
between cash and care. Although this paper concentrates
on the former set of issues, issues concerning revenue
raising cannot be divorced from issues concerning alloca-
tion of resources. 
Glendinning et al. (2004) proposed four criteria for assess-
ing long-term care financing systems: equity; promotion of
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dignity, choice and independence; efficiency and effective-
ness; economic and political sustainability. The Wanless
Review (Wanless et al., 2006, p.11) used six similar crite-
ria: fairness; economic efficiency; choice; physical resource
development; clarity; sustainability/acceptability. 
Efficiency and effectiveness are key criteria in economic
analyses. Effectiveness refers to the achievement of a
policy’s stated objectives. Efficiency may be regarded as
the achievement of maximum output, in terms of quantity
and quality, for a given level of expenditure. In the context
of long-term care, it is not ultimately service outputs that
are valued but outcomes for users and carers. Achieving
efficiency may, however, in practice be impeded by unsat-
isfactory incentives. For example, fragmented funding
streams generate incentives and opportunities for cost-shift-
ing agencies: where the costs of care are shared between
agencies, the agency responsible for assessing care needs
may not appreciate the true resource costs of different types
of care. 
Another key criterion has been equity or fairness. Equity
is affected both by the ways that revenues are raised and
how those resources are allocated. Equity considerations
include equity of access; equity in level and mix of serv-
ices relative to needs; and equity of outcomes. In the context
of long-term care a key concern is horizontal equity – the
provision of equal care for equal needs (Glendinning, 2004).
The issue of what constitutes equity is clearly normative.
Generalised perceptions of fairness may influence political
judgements about balancing criteria as indicators of degrees
of inequity of different kinds.
Independence, dignity and choice have been increasingly
highlighted as objectives of community care policy gener-
ally (RCLTC, 1999) In the context of evaluating approaches
to funding, key concerns may be to ensure that arrange-
ments do not unduly limit older people’s choice of care;
distort preferences through unsatisfactory incentives; or
create stigma or social exclusion. 
Affordability and sustainability are important criteria and
are also increasingly stated explicitly as evaluation criteria
(e.g. House of Commons Health Committee, 1996). As
there is much uncertainty about future demand for long-term
care, and the resources required to meet that demand,
funding arrangements need to be flexible and include effec-
tive cost control mechanisms. Political sustainability and
acceptability is also important. 
Funding mechanisms: private
Long-term care for most older people in England is provided
or so supported by informal carers as to be in effect financed
by them. They carry costs in terms of lost remuneration
for employment opportunities foregone; leisure time fore-
gone; direct care-related costs; psychic and health-related
costs; and welfare costs of attention diverted from other
family responsibilities. In respect of formal care services,
costs may be incurred through user charges for publicly
subsidised care; direct private purchase of services; and,
possibly, premiums for private long-term care insurance.
Older people with the resources to do so could fund long-
term care from their income and/or savings (including the
value of their home). If necessary they could release
resources invested in their home through equity release
schemes (JRF, 2006). The use of savings does not, however,
seem efficient. Since not everyone will need long term
care, it is not necessary for everyone to save sufficient to
meet the average cost of care, let alone the maximum likely
life-time cost. Risk pooling through insurance seems more
efficient than saving for long-term care needs. Moreover,
it would also redistribute from those with lesser to those
with greater care needs. 
Private insurance is not, however, always feasible (Barr,
1993). Insurance for long-term care faces serious problems
of market failure. These include problems about adverse
selection, uncertainty concerning future risks, insurance-
induced demand, and potential changes in dependency rates
across the population. There are also difficulties about
consumer knowledge and affordability (Glennerster, 1997;
Wiener et al., 1994). Pricing of long-term care insurance
seems to be especially problematic. A key reason is that
there is neither past experience of claims nor quality UK
data with which to estimate the size of the lifetime risks
involved. Measures to counteract these problems – for
example, through exclusions, limitations, co-payments and
higher premiums – tend to reduce the affordability and/or
attractiveness of policies.
The attractiveness and affordability of long-term care insur-
ance constitutes a significant problem. Only a minority of
the population could reasonably afford long-term care insur-
ance unless purchased early in life (or possibly through
home equity release). Yet early in life people have other
priorities and may be poorly informed about the risk of long
term care and about the arrangements for public funding of
long term care. Private long term care insurance, volun-
tarily purchased, therefore seems most unlikely to become
widespread in England, as the Wanless review acknowl-
edged (Wanless et al., 2006, p.287). The recent exit of all
but one provider from the long-term care insurance market
in the UK lends weight to this view. 
In principle, public support for private insurance could
address some of these problems. Tax concessions or subsi-
dies could reduce the cost to enrolees of insurance
premiums, although the impact on demand for insurance
would be uncertain. The public sector could reduce the
cost of private long term care insurance by effectively
taking part of the risk. Such partnership schemes which have
been introduced by some US states have this effect. Those
who purchase private insurance offering benefits of a spec-
ified minimum amount are treated more favourably under
a means test, should they later exhaust their insurance bene-
fits and seek public funding for their care. Such policies
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could have lower premiums than policies with unlimited
cover, because the public sector takes part of the risk.
Nevertheless, the uptake of partnership policies in the USA
has proved low.
Finally, the public sector could intervene to the extent of
making long term care insurance compulsory. This could
reduce adverse selection and other informational problems
and improve affordability. Such an arrangement would,
however, be regressive in comparison with social insurance:
while payments for social insurance tend to be based on
earnings or other forms of income, premiums for private
insurance are based on individual risk, not income. The
public sector could in principle address such distributional
concerns by subsiding premiums on a means tested basis.
This would, however, raise the issue of whether a compul-
sory, subsidised private sector insurance system would be
preferable to a public sector system.
Funding mechanisms: public
The primary rationale for a public sector scheme is that it
would allow both efficiency (through risk pooling) and
equity (through redistribution) objectives to be achieved
(Glendinning, 2004). A public sector scheme could range
from a safety net with a substantial means test as in the UK
and USA to a universal scheme for the whole population
as in Germany and Japan. The main sources of public
funding for long-term care are general taxation, as in the
UK, Australia and Scandinavian countries; social insurance
as in Germany and Netherlands; or a combination of both,
as in Japan. 
The difference between a tax-funded scheme and a social
insurance scheme does not lie in insurance, since a tax-
funded scheme also involves risk-pooling, but in the
following features:
• hypothecation of revenues, that is contributions that
are dedicated to long-term care; 
• a link between contributions and benefits, but the link
may be weak where there are credits for spells of
unemployment, etc.;
• national, enforceable eligibility criteria;
• absence of a means-test but insurance can incorporate
non-means-tested co-payments and deductibles.
Hypothecation has been advocated (JRF, 1996) as a means
of ensuring that a specified level of resources is guaranteed
for a specified purpose. Hypothecated funds for long-term
care, such as in Germany, would mean that these resources
would no longer compete directly with funding for other
NHS or local authority services. Hypothecation has also
been advocated as a means to raise more revenue for an
important or popular purpose: it might be more acceptable
to the public than an increase in general taxation, but this
seems uncertain. Hypothecation is not without drawbacks.
One problem is that the revenues raised through contribu-
tions based on earnings in any year would be affected by
the economic cycle. Supplementation from general tax
revenues or borrowing might be needed in some years. 
A social insurance approach with hypothecated funding has,
however, ceased to be part of the current debate. The debate
now centres around three options (Wanless et al., 2006):
• introduction of free personal care, on the lines of
Scotland, under which there is no means-test for care
costs; 
• retention of the current means-tested arrangements,
possibly with reforms such as those recommended by
the JRF and/or with limit liability, such as a limit to
the number of years for which the users are required
to fund their care;
• implementation of the Wanless recommendation for a
partnership funding scheme, as described below.
Bell and Bowes (2005) have reviewed the introduction of
free personal care in Scotland. The Scottish system involves
non-means-tested personal care at home and a flat rate non-
means-tested contribution to nursing and personal care costs
in care homes but not to ‘hotel costs’. They found that the
main beneficiaries have been people with dementia and
people with modest means. Free personal care has not been
accompanied by a major shift from informal to formal care.
It has, however, proved more costly than expected and the
costs are set to rise because of demographic pressures and
rising home ownership.
Hancock et al. (2005) estimated that the introduction of free
personal care throughout the UK would cost between £1.3
billion and £1.8 billion in additional public expenditure for
2002 and would take public expenditure to between 2.15%
and 2.40% of GDP in 2051 or more if there were an impact
on demand for care. Free personal care would benefit home-
owners more than non-owners and would benefit older
people in the higher quintiles of the income distribution. If
financed by an increase in the higher rate of income tax,
however, the net gain would be greatest for the middle
income quintile of the whole population and top income
quintile would be net losers. 
There are a variety of ways in which the current means
tested system could be reformed. These include:
• amending the capital limits by raising them, abolishing
the upper limit above which service users are
ineligible for any public (as in pension credit) or
disregarding housing assets completely;
• increasing the personal expenses allowance for those
in residential care and/or relaxing the treatment of
income for those receiving home care;
• limiting liability to fund care privately by setting a
life-time limit to private payments defined in terms of
years of payment or total private outlay.
Hancock et al. (2006) found that such options for reforming
30
AGEING HORIZONS  Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
the means-test would each cost between £250 million and
£1,000 million in 2002 in additional public expenditure and
would take public expenditure on long-term care for older
people to around 2.25% of GDP in 2051 rather than to 1.95%
under the current funding system. These options mostly
favour home owners and higher income groups, with the
exception of raising the personal expenses allowance.
Hancock et al. (2006) also considered a limited liability model
with a lifetime maximum payment of £100,000 for residen-
tial care. The beneficiaries from this option would mostly be
home owners with gains concentrated in the highest income
group; the cost would be around £250 million. 
The Wanless review favoured a partnership arrangement
‘characterised by combining a publicly funded entitlement
to a guaranteed level of care, with a variable component
made up of contributions from individuals matched at a
given rate by contributions from the state’ (Wanless et al.,
p.278). Wanless proposed that the publicly funded entitle-
ment should be two-thirds of the benchmark level of care.
Users could choose whether they wanted the remaining
third, with the costs being met half by the user and half by
the state. The benchmark level of care is the level that is
cost-effective given a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000
per ADLAY (that is the gain for one year of life of having
core activities of daily living (ADL) needs improved from
being entirely unmet to being fully met). A partnership
arrangement on these lines would require an increase in
public expenditure of some £3.5 billion. 
The Wanless report compares a partnership arrangement
with free personal care or a means-tested system as follows:
• the partnership model is efficient: it produces the
highest ratio of outcomes (ADLAYs) to costs of the
three funding systems (p.270);
• it has strengths and weaknesses in regard to equity
and fairness: ‘for the guaranteed element, support is
based entirely on need and not ability to pay, but the
converse is largely the case for the matched
element. . .’ (p.269);
• it scores well on choice, as individuals will be able to
choose the level of care they receive above the
guaranteed level, albeit subject to co-payment;
• it scores as well as free personal care on dignity as no
means-testing would be required within the care
system;
• it is not a strong as a means-tested system on
economic sustainability, but if necessary ‘the
guaranteed entitlement can be scaled back to reduce
costs. . . or the matching contribution can be reduced’
(p.271); and more options for dealing with
sustainability could be added. 
Conclusion 
The debate about how best to finance long-term care for
older people in England continues. The recent Wanless
report and JRF report have highlighted a choice between
three broad approaches for change: free personal care,
reform of the current means-tested system or partnership
arrangement. As Wanless concluded, ‘all have strengths
and all have weaknesses’ (p.284). Policy-makers have a
window of opportunity to consider these approaches before
demographic pressures accelerate when the baby-boom
cohorts reach late old age. Decisions will need to reflect
the chosen balance between the different criteria for apprais-
ing options. They will also need to be consistent with
developments in other areas of public policy such as health
care and pensions.
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Population ageing will intensify the distributional dilem-
mas related to provision and funding of long-term care
(LTC) services. Several OECD countries have recently
reformed their LTC systems, but as yet there is a paucity
of evidence on how different reform options affect the
financial position of different socioeconomic groups.
Another neglected issue is how individuals adapt to
changes as a result of LTC policy reform. One compli-
cation in the analysis of LTC reform is the great
uncertainty in projections. This is largely due to the long
planning horizon needed, and also the nature of LTC serv-
ices themselves. The aim of this paper is to review two
recent contributions to the literature: Hancock et al. (2006)
and Karlsson et al. (2007). Particular emphasis is placed
on the policy implications of these findings, but we also
identify key issues for future research.
1. Background
The subject of long-term care (LTC) is receiving increas-
ing attention both in the research community and in the
governments of various countries due to the belief that an
ageing population will greatly swell the demand for LTC
services and create a huge public expense. One of the press-
ing issues is to determine by how much the demand for LTC
will increase. Since all LTC systems by necessity entail a
great degree of redistribution – over the life-cycle, from
the young to the old, and between generations – another
pressing issue is to address distributional concerns. It is the
objective of this article to review recent research findings
concerning these two issues.
1.1 Dependency and Ageing
LTC is administered to people who have reached a stage
in life in which they are dependent on others for social,
personal and medical needs. It is usually associated with
the very old but, in fact, it could begin at any age depend-
ing on the reasons for the disability (perhaps, a road
accident, a mental or a congenital condition). The age gradi-
ent in disability does however become very clear in Figure
1. The latter depicts a survival curve for males and females
based on English Life Tables 15 (ONS, 1997). A life table
does not represent the actual population but what the popu-
lation would look like if age-specific mortality were to
apply to a synthetic population, usually, 100,000 people.
The light shaded area of the figure represents the propor-
tion of the surviving population that is disabled.
The average ‘stock’ of the disabled of a given age and the
duration of their disability are represented by the vertical
line A-C and horizontal line A-B, respectively. It is strik-
ing that the duration of disability tends to be constant if it
begins in older ages but it is significantly longer if it begins
in younger ages, say, between 40 and 50 years. The overall
average is 9.91 years. If we were to construct the same
diagram for the most severely disabled only, the light shaded
area would be much narrower. It would represent those who
are likely to be in need of intensive nursing or palliative
care. For this group, the duration of severe disability aver-
ages 1.48 years.
1.2 Systems for funding and providing LTC
As yet, there is little by way of comparative analysis to help
governments decide which approach to the provision and
funding of LTC strikes the right balance between the various
objectives of public policy. To date, the main focus has been
on aggregate costs, but the policy-maker also needs to be
concerned with economic efficiency as well as intra- and
intergenerational equity. This in turn requires a careful
analysis of the distributional effects of the various funding
regimes for LTC, which is the topic of this paper.
There is a wide variety of LTC systems at work in the devel-
oped world. Countries have generally chosen very different
paths and reforms have normally borrowed inspiration more
from national traditions in the realms of health care and
public pensions, than from other countries’ models (cf.
Scheil-Adlung, 1995). LTC systems may be evaluated in
many dimensions and there is thus a multitude of possibil-
ities for public policy. As suggested by Wittenberg et al.
(2002), the most important decisions that policy-makers
and society as a whole have to consider are:
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Figure 1: Survival curve based on English Life Tables 15
(ONS, 1997)
• the boundary between LTC and health care;
• the role of the family in provision and financing of
LTC;
• the balance between residential and home-based
services;
• the provider roles of public and private bodies;
• the form of the public subsidy.
These differences in the role of the state have implications
for the aggregate costs. In Sweden, total public expendi-
ture on LTC for elderly comes to 3.0 per cent of GDP
(Socialstyrelsen, 2006). This is several times more than in
Southern Europe, where total expenditure – public and
private – falls short of one per cent of GDP (cf. Comas-
Herrera et al., 2006). Most countries lie somewhere in
between. For instance, in the UK around 1 per cent of GDP
is contributed from the public purse each year. It is clear
in Figure 2 that these differences between countries are not
entirely attributable to different demographic situations.
For example, Italy has a relatively high proportion (4.0 per
cent) of very old people, but spends only 0.6 per cent of
GDP on LTC. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the
very old are a smaller group (3.2 per cent of the popula-
tion) and yet LTC costs are much higher (2.5 per cent of
GDP).
Given that the projection of needs of and costs for LTC is
complicated by several uncertainties, a formal assessment
of the various LTC funding regimes displayed in Figure 2
is difficult. Moreover, analysis of intergenerational equity
will typically need to involve very long time spans – which
further aggravates the problems related to uncertainties.
This means that projections and analyses of LTC costs have
to be interpreted with more caution than, for example,
pension projections.
1.3 Uncertainties in trends
Various uncertainties concerning future LTC costs appear
on the demand as well as on the supply side. On the
supply side, the main issues are whether relative wages
of care workers change in the long term (possibly, but
not only, as an effect of the surge in demand for LTC
services) and whether technological improvements allow
for increased efficiency in provision. Furthermore, the
availability of informal carers is a key issue also as far
as formal services are concerned, due to the high degree
of substitutability between the two types of services. In
this part, there seem to be countervailing trends, the
relative importance of which is difficult to assess at
present. Trends in supply seem to depend on who
provides the care. Care provided by children can be
expected to decrease in the future. Although reduction
in supply due to increased female labour market partic-
ipation could be compensated by the growing pool of fit
younger retirees, changes in social norms and geograph-
ical distances between generations seem to be a growing
barrier to intergenerational care. Spouses, on the other
hand, can be expected to take on greater responsibilities
in the future (Pickard et al., 2000). Hence, the overall
supply of informal care remains an open issue. There
seems to be a widespread agreement, however, that the
availability of informal carers is unlikely to keep up
with the need for care (cf. Karlsson et al., 2006).
On the demand side, there is uncertainty concerning the
future income and asset distribution of older people, but
the main uncertainty is of course related to the future
development of morbidity. Over the past 30 years, there
has been an intense academic debate on the implications
for healthy life expectancy (HLE) of falling mortality
rates. Three competing hypotheses have been proposed.
The most optimistic one, suggesting a compression of
morbidity, was proposed by Fries (1980). According to
this perspective, adult life expectancy is approaching its
biological limit so that if disability spells can be post-
poned to higher ages the result will be an overall
reduction in the time spent disabled. By contrast,
Gruenberg (1977) suggested an expansion of morbidity
based on the argument that the observed decline in
mortality was mainly due to falling accident rates. The
third hypothesis was proposed by Manton (1987) accord-
ing to whom the development in mortality and morbidity
is a combination of the two, which could lead to an
expansion of the time spent in good health as well as
the time spent in disability.
There is, however, not yet enough empirical evidence
available to draw a definite conclusion on how the gap
between healthy life expectancy and total life expectancy
is behaving in all countries. Concerning the UK, the
estimates based on the General Household Survey suggest
that the prevailing trend largely depends on the defini-
tion of disability. Hence, there is relatively strong
evidence of a contraction of the time spent in severe
disability as a proportion of total life expectancy. For
moderate disability, trends are less clear and partly
dependent on the definition of disability used (Bone et
al., 1995; Bebbington and Darton, 1996; Bebbington and
Comas-Herrera, 2000).
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Figure 2: Public Expenditure on Long-Term Care and
Demographic Situation; adaptation from Casey (2003)
1.4. LTC Projections
How to treat the ambiguity concerning future morbidity
has been one of the main challenges of previous projection
models. Existing models for projections of future needs for
LTC are either cell based macrosimulation models or
microsimulation models (cf. Nutall et al., 1994; Wittenberg
et al., 2006; Richards et al., 1996; Hancock et al., 2003).
Microsimulation has two main advantages. Firstly, since it
deals with the entire distribution of certain variables in the
population, it allows for a very detailed analysis of various
aspects of policy changes – such as, for example, their
implications for spend-down of care recipient’s assets.
Secondly, microsimulation also allows for modelling behav-
ioural responses – such as responses in demand to changes
in public subsidies (O’Donoghue, 2001). To date, however,
it has been common to assume that there are no such behav-
ioural changes. The main downside of microsimulation is
that there are severe limitations to the interactions between
variables which microsimulation analysis can take into
account due to either a lack of rich datasets or computing
constraints. Hence, microsimulation runs the risk of giving
an illusion of realism that may, in fact, be unfounded.
One of the first rigorous reports on the future costs of
long term care was provided by Nuttall et al. (1994).
The projection was based on a multi-state model of
disability, where the three states are assumed to be
healthy, disabled and dead. Separate series of models
were built to incorporate the severity of disability in
which no recovery was allowed once the particular
disabled state has been reached. The 1980s OPCS study
(Martin et al., 1988) of disability provided the basis for
prevalence rates (with the implicit assumption that preva-
lence rates by age had remained constant between 1986
and 1991, the base year). The study projected a rapid
increase in the demand for long term care from 2011
onwards. In order to estimate the future costs of LTC,
it was assumed that LTC costs remain constant in terms
of GNP (alternative scenarios with changing relative
prices were also considered). According to the central
projection, LTC costs as a share of GNP would increase
by 47 per cent (from 7.3 per cent to 10.8 per cent).
More recent projections have been provided by the PSSRU
(Wittenberg et al., 1998; see Wittenberg et al., 2006 for
the most recent version). The PSSRU model, originally
developed for the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care
(1999), assumes that dependency rates by age and sex
remain constant over the projection period and uses a cell-
based model to project the future demand for LTC services
and the implied costs. The dependency measure used in the
PSSRU model is based on Activities of Daily Living (ADLs)
and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) failed
by the individual. Sensitivity analysis allows for different
assumptions concerning trends in life expectancy and disabil-
ity. Karlsson et al. (2006), on the other hand, use continuing
improvement in prevalence of disability as their baseline
assumption, and then consider constant disability rates as
a “pessimistic” scenario.
Most developed countries use some kind of projection model
to assess future costs of long-term care. In Germany, it has
been suggested that the current social insurance arrangement
is untenable in the long term, since projections suggest that
contribution rates will explode in the future (SVR, 2004).
For Sweden, on the other hand, a projection model based
on longitudinal data suggests that the demography-driven
increases in LTC spending might be almost completely
offset by improvements in morbidity (Lagergren, 2005). In
a study commissioned by the European Commission, finally,
projection models for Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK
were compared, showing that projections for Southern
European countries are more sensitive to changes in policy
(Comas-Herrera and Wittenberg, 2003; Comas-Herrera et
al., 2006).
2. The Redistributive effects of LTC systems
Aggregate cost projections for long-term care have received
considerable attention in media and in the policy debate,
whereas the distributional impact of various reforms to the
funding formula have largely been neglected. Nevertheless,
there are clear indications that the system currently oper-
ating in England and Wales is not perceived as ‘fair’
(Hirsch, 2005) and there seems to be “widespread dissat-
isfaction with the current means-tested funding
arrangements” (Wanless, 2006). Besides, the great diver-
sity in long-term systems among OECD countries (Karlsson
et al., 2004) suggests that it is far from obvious which is
the most equitable system for funding and provision of
long-term care.
2.1 Equity in Long-Term Care
Discussions of equity normally make the distinction between
horizontal and vertical equity – where horizontal equity
requires that equal cases be treated equally, and vertical
equity requires different cases to be treated differently.
Concerning long-term care, however, there are several
dimensions of such ‘vertical’ equity which have to be taken
into account. The most important dimension is, of course,
the distribution between people in need of care and others.
However, distributive justice also requires the system to
strike a fair balance between the young and the old, the poor
and the rich, and between men and women. Furthermore,
there have been some concerns in the UK that the current
system fails to deliver ‘horizontal equity’ as well – such as
the ‘diagnostic equities’ identified by Hancock et al. (2006).
‘Diagnostic inequities’ are due to the fact that people suffer-
ing from illnesses for which treatments exist get personal
care free of charge within the NHS, whereas those who
suffer from conditions for which no treatments exist (such
as Alzheimer’s disease) do not. Similarly, there have been
concerns that the decentralised system for LTC in Sweden
leads to unacceptable regional variation in eligibility crite-
ria (Karlsson et al., 2004). In summary, equity in the
funding and provision of LTC is a complex issue.
Moreover, even if we had a clear concept of distributional
fairness, the formal analysis of different funding formulae
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faces several methodological challenges. For instance, in
the presence of behavioural responses on the part of the indi-
viduals affected, any policy analysis will face the difficulty
of determining the appropriate baseline scenario (cf. Bergh,
2005). Besides, the long time perspectives complicate the
analysis of distributional effects somewhat – for instance,
in the presence of systematic differences in life expectancy,
it is unclear whether total lifetime redistribution is the
appropriate measure.
Two recent contributions have analysed the distributional
effects of changing the system for funding LTC in the
United Kingdom: the PSSRU-CARESIM model (Hancock
et al., 2006; Malley et al., 2006; see Hancock et al.
2006b for a summary) and the model by Karlsson et al.
(2007). Both models take the current system as their
starting point and analyse the effects of different alter-
ations to this system. The techniques used are very
different, however. The PSSRU-CARESIM model uses
microsimulation techniques and focus mainly on the
distribution within the group of older people. Karlsson
et al. (2007) use a simpler approach to analyse the
distributional impact of different regimes, but are able
to do the analysis in a life cycle perspective.
2.2 The PSSRU-CARESIM Model
The PSSRU-CARESIM model was used to assess the cost
implications of the Wanless Review (Malley et al., 2006).
In this article, however, we focus on the distributional
analysis undertaken in Hancock et al. (2006). The paper
uses the already mentioned PSSRU model (Wittenberg et
al., 2006) to project future needs for long-term care, and
the CARESIM model (Hancock, 2000) for the distribution
of incomes and assets in the older population. The main
advantage of the CARESIM model is that it allows taking
into account the non-linearities in the means testing formula
and the spend-down of assets that is bound to happen in
such a system. In the means testing formula operating in
the UK, personal assets are treated differently depending
on whether they exceed £21,000 (in which case the indi-
vidual has to cover the full care costs out of pocket), fall
between £12,500 and £21,000 (in which case an income is
imputed) or are below £12,500 (in which case they are
disregarded altogether in the means test). The value of the
recipient’s home is disregarded for three months – and
longer if a close relative is still living there. The CARESIM
model uses the British Family Resources Survey to derive
the joint distribution of incomes and assets among older
people, and can thus assess the eligibility to a public subsidy
under various regimes and the implied total costs.
Hancock et al. (2006) consider a host of different reform
scenarios. Most of them are to do with the means testing
formula for capital mentioned above. The authors allow for
four different types of reform:
• An increase of the capital threshold from £21,000 to
£150,000. The amount was chosen so as to correspond
to the average value of homes owned by older people.
This reform scenario would benefit people with assets
between £21,000 and £150,000 – a group which pays
all LTC costs out of pocket in the current regime.
• Increases in the upper and lower capital thresholds to
£50,000 and £150,000 respectively. This option would
benefit all care recipients with assets between £12,500
and £150,000.
• Abolishing the upper capital threshold, and changing
the imputed income from capital from £1 per £250 to
£1 per £500. This reform scenario would benefit most
care recipients with assets above £21,000.
• Full and permanent disregard of housing wealth.
Furthermore, the authors analyse two reforms to the funding
of residential care:
• An increase in the Personal Expenses Allowance – the
income that every care home resident is allowed to
retain for personal needs – from £18.05 to £73.10 per
week. This reform option is likely to benefit residents
on lower incomes. The new allowance was chosen so
as to achieve equivalence, from a public expenditure
point of view, with offering free personal care.
• A lifetime limit on the amount an individual is
required to pay towards institutional care costs. An
overall limit of £100,000 is considered. This reform
option is believed to promote the market for private
long-term care insurance, since it removes some of the
less insurable risks related to LTC – such as cost
inflation and the risk of catastrophic care needs.
Finally, the paper also analyses the implications of offer-
ing free personal care in institutions. This was one of the
reforms suggested by the Royal Commission (1999). It was
later dismissed by the government in the 2001 Health and
Social Care Act since it was expected to benefit relatively
well-off older people. The Scottish Executive, however, did
introduce free personal care in Scotland. The paper analy-
ses two different methods of indexation for the personal care
subsidy, and assumes that the costs are to be covered by
an increase in marginal tax rates for high earners.
The paper by Hancock et al. delivers two types of results:
estimates of aggregate costs and of distributional effects.
Concerning the aggregate costs, the various reform options
are expressed as percentage of GDP devoted to long-term
care. Since there are no behavioural changes in the model,
total costs are the same for each scenario (but vary over
time) whereas the distribution between public and private
spending is different in the different scenarios. According
to these estimates, total costs devoted to LTC will increase
by around 20–25 per cent between 2002 and 2022, irre-
spective of reform scenario.
If implemented, the different reform options studied
would lead to increases in public spending on LTC of
between 3 and 20 per cent, depending on scenario. The
most costly reform option is to provide free personal
care, as already practiced in Scotland. Such a change
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would increase aggregate costs from 0.96 per cent of
GDP to around 1.1 per cent of GDP. In the long term,
that reform option would cost as much as 1.3 per cent
of GDP. Conversely, the cheapest reform option by far
is to introduce a lifetime limit on LTC costs, which
would increase costs only marginally compared with
keeping the current funding formula. This finding is
expected since only relatively few people with very high
LTC costs would be affected by the change.
Concerning the distributive effects of the reform, the paper
focuses on the short-term gainers and losers from changes
in the public benefits – whereas the revenue side is largely
ignored. In general, it seems to be difficult to rank the
different options according to their “progressiveness”, since
the gains or losses from some changes are concentrated in
both tails of the income distribution. For example, the
proposal to disregard all housing assets has the gainers
concentrated in the middle classes whereas the poor (who
are unlikely to own their houses) and the rich (who have
enough non-housing assets to be exempt from public
funding) stand to gain less. Raising the upper capital limit
to £150,000, on the other hand, benefits low earners dispro-
portionately – presumably because their assets tend to be
below that amount. The most striking distributive effect,
however, is that all reform proposals concerning means
testing of assets imply tremendous gains to home owners
compared with non-owners.
For the two scenarios specific to residential care – increas-
ing the personal expenses allowance or introducing a lifetime
limit on contributions, the gains are relatively unevenly
distributed, as illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows how
the relative gains from the reform are distributed over
different income quintiles – as well as between home owners
and non-owners. An increase in the personal expenses
allowance is more favourable to low earners, since these
are more likely to be affected by it. Home owners, however,
only get 64 per cent of the average gain.
Concerning free personal care, the authors consider three
different variants which have very similar implications. If
the revenue side is ignored, introducing free personal care
is clearly a regressive reform, since high earners stand to
gain disproportionately. If the reform is financed from an
increase in income taxes on higher incomes, however, the
gains are instead concentrated in the middle of the income
distribution.
2.3 The model by Karlsson et al.
The study of Hancock et al. (2006) can be contrasted with
a study by Karlsson et al. (2007). The issues discussed in
the two studies are very similar, but the methodological
approaches differ substantially. Karlsson et al. (2007) use
a projection model based on the OPCS disability survey
from the 1980s (Martin et al, 1988) to estimate the life cycle
redistribution implied by various reform options. Using
data from the OPCS survey, the model has been calibrated
so as to replicate official population projections from the
Government’s Actuary Department. The OPCS uses a
10–graded scale of disability which is slightly different
from the ADL and IADL measures which form the basis
of the PSSRU model used by Hancock et al. (2006).
The main advantage of the model of Karlsson et al. (2007)
is that it is based on a so-called multiple state model and
hence allows tracing an individual over the entire life course
(details of the underlying disability model are provided in
Karlsson et al., 2006). This way, individual contributions
to, and benefits from, the public LTC system can be meas-
ured in a life cycle perspective. The main limitation of the
model is, however, that it does not allow for analysis of
the entire distribution of assets and incomes in the popula-
tion. Hence, the authors restrict themselves to analysing a
set of ‘stylised individuals’, which differ in various dimen-
sions, such as
• sex and the generation they were born;
• their earnings potential (low/middle/high).
In contrast to Hancock et al., this model does not focus on
the UK debate concerning funding of long-term care, but
instead analyses the implications of introducing LTC systems
as practiced in other OECD countries into the UK. The
current system for financing LTC is contrasted with three
different alternatives:
• One scenario similar to the German model for LTC.
This includes a mandatory social insurance scheme
(from which high earners can opt out), covering
roughly half of actual costs in the various care
settings. Furthermore, people with insufficient
resources to cover remaining costs get income support
financed through general taxation.
• One scenario similar to the Japanese model for LTC.
This includes a universal social insurance which
covers roughly 90 per cent of long-term care costs in
any care setting. The social insurance benefits are
financed in equal shares from contributions from
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Figure 3: Relative gain from scenarios specific to
residential care: recipients of residential care aged 85+,
2002
people aged 40 and over and general income taxes.
• One scenario similar to the Swedish system for LTC.
This includes small but income-related out of pocket-
payments in residential care. The public subsidy is
financed out of proportional income taxes.
As in Hancock et al. (2006), the authors provide projec-
tions of the overall costs implied by the different regimes,
as well as analysis of distributive effects. One main differ-
ence, however, is that the analysis of distributive effects
takes contributions paid into the system into account, and
also studies the entire life course of individuals. Due to the
very long time perspectives involved when LTC is
concerned, however, the authors study a period of transi-
tion from the current system to another one, and not how
different ‘mature’ systems would fare in comparison. One
consequence of this is that it makes little sense to compare
the estimates of gains and losses within a certain scenario
– as contributions already made to the current system are
disregarded – whereas a systematic comparison of the differ-
ent scenarios can be very informative.
Concerning overall costs, the authors find that all three of
the alternative systems considered would imply increased
public costs and thus increased taxes. In Table 1, the LTC
costs expressed as a tax rate are set out for period 2000–
2040 for the LTC systems used in Germany, Sweden, Japan
and the UK.
Table 1: Implied tax rates from different countries’ LTC
systems*
Scenario 2000 (%) 2020 (%) 2040 (%)
UK 0.99 1.02 1.30
Sweden 2.40 2.45 3.11
Germany General 0.50 0.50 0.63
Social
insurance 2.08 2.13 2.71
Japan General 1.11 1.13 1.44
Social
insurance 3.00 2.89 3.60
* For the German and Japanese scenarios, ‘general’ refers to
the tax rate paid on earnings by everybody, whereas ‘social
insurance’ refers to total contributions (social insurance and tax)
paid by non-high earners (Germany) or people aged 40+
(Japan).
It is clear that, despite the differences between the systems,
the tax rates necessary to finance LTC will increase by
roughly the same percentage regardless of which system is
employed. The tax rate would increase by approximately
30 per cent by 2040 in all cases. The only exception is the
Japanese scenario, where those making social insurance
contributions benefit from the increase in the proportion of
people aged 40 and over. As a result, the social insurance
contribution rate needs to increase much less. However,
general tax rates would still have to increase quite substan-
tially over the period. This finding highlights a dilemma
the policy maker faces: the trade-off between comprehen-
siveness and cost control. A less comprehensive system,
such as the Japanese one, is less sensitive to demographic
changes, but it also allows for less redistribution and less
mitigation of certain risks (e.g. health, longevity, or cost
risks).
The model predictions could also be compared with projec-
tions made in the countries from which the scenarios have
been borrowed. For example, a recent study by Lagergren
(2005) shows that Swedish LTC costs can be expected to
increase by 25 to 69 per cent between 2000 and 2030,
depending on trends in health. A German projection, on the
other hand, suggested that the social insurance contributions
could amount to between 2 and 8 per cent in 2040, depend-
ing on how relative costs of care develop (SVR, 2004). This
discrepancy is in part due to the adverse demographic situ-
ation in Germany, and in part due to more conservative
assumptions concerning improvements in health.
Turning to the distributive aspects, Karlsson et al. provide
a range of measures of how the different scenarios perform
in various dimensions of equity. Since we are considering
life cycle redistribution, there are at least two alternative
measures available for this exercise: one is net contribu-
tions to the system (Net Present Value, NPV) and the other
is the internal rate of return, measured as the ratio between
benefits received and contributions paid to the system (i.e.
Money’s Worth).
One important result is that, in monetary terms, all the
systems considered are remarkably favourable to women.
This is not a surprise in itself, but it is the differences
between systems that are noteworthy. In net present value
terms, the typical difference is between £3,000 (Germany)
and £13,000 (Sweden), and in terms of ‘money’s worth’,
women get between 91 pence (Germany) and £1.60
(Sweden) more in return for each pound spent on LTC than
their male counterparts. These differences are mainly due
to the fact that women are more likely to become disabled,
and that they tend to be in more expensive care settings for
a given disability severity level. Differences in income are
of secondary importance.
For the rest, the results are quite as expected. A Swedish-
style system would above all benefit low earners and old
people, whereas a Japanese-style system is particularly
favourable for young males. The ‘intergenerational’ profile
of the different scenarios is summarised in Figure 4. Since
we are studying a transition period, the age gradient in the
net present values is hardly surprising. However, useful
comparisons of relative effects between the different scenar-
ios can still be made, since they give an indication of where
a certain system puts its emphasis and what cohorts are
particularly advantaged, in relative terms. In doing so, we
note that young and middle-aged people would prefer the
UK system, whereas relatively old people would prefer a
Swedish-style system. On the other hand, the Swedish
system is the worst for young people and the UK system
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is the worst for old people. The Japanese system is the worst
for 40–year olds, primarily due to the fact that they pay a
considerable share of the costs without being entitled to
many benefits. The German system falls in between, but is
generally better for young than for old people. 
2.4 Assessment
The two studies compared here address the same type of
issues, but the approaches chosen are so different that it
is scarcely possible to make meaningful comparisons
between the two. Hancock et al. (2006) focus on short-
term effects and largely disregard contributions paid to
the system, whereas Karlsson et al. (2007) study the
redistribution in a life cycle perspective. On the other
hand, the PSSRU-CARESIM model allows for a more
complete analysis of the entire distribution of income
and assets in the elderly population. Hence, apart from
the estimates of aggregate costs there is very little
overlap between the two studies.
Concerning these aggregate costs, there is a striking differ-
ence between the two studies in the timing of the increase.
According to Karlsson et al. (2007), LTC costs take off only
after 2020, whereas Hancock et al. (2006) project a signif-
icant increase already by 2022. One reason is that the study
by Karlsson et al. expresses aggregate costs as a propor-
tion of total earnings in the economy, whereas the PSSRU
model takes costs as a proportion of GDP. Since there is
a growing group of pensioners – who earn income without
contributing to the GDP – the two measures diverge.
Furthermore, the model by Karlsson et al. (2006) allows
for improvements in morbidity which are consistent with
recent empirical evidence.
Concerning the distributional side, the issues studied and
the time perspectives involved make direct comparison
difficult. What both studies highlight, however, is that it
is typically not possible to rank different reform options
according to some simple criterion such as ‘progressive-
ness’. This is mainly due to the fact that when LTC is
concerned, several dimensions of redistribution overlap –
from men to women, from the young to the old, between
home owners and non-home owners, and from the
healthy to the ill. It follows – as was mentioned initially
– that the issue of equity in funding and provision of
long-term care is very complex and needs to be analysed
with great care.
3. Concluding Remarks
The existing models for projecting LTC costs are very sophis-
ticated in some respects, but disregard other important aspects
of LTC funding completely. Hence, there is a wide scope for
future improvements in projection models for dependency
and long-term care. In this section, we discuss the policy
implications of the articles reviewed and then give a brief
overview of possible future research developments.
Firstly, the research by Hancock et al. (2006) suggests that
the widely discussed reform option of free personal care
might not be the most efficient way to relieve care recipi-
ents in the middle income brackets. It is a very costly
option – leading to an immediate ten per cent increase in
public LTC costs – and yet it benefits many care recipients
who are not really in need of public interventions. Changes
to the means testing of capital, on the other hand, come at
slightly lower cost, yet tend to benefit the middle income
brackets much more. In conclusion, there might still be
strong reasons to treat health care and long-term care differ-
ently, despite the perceived ‘diagnostic inequities’ inherent
in such a system.
On the other hand, their research also shows that trends in
the various factors determining the needs and ability to pay
for LTC may change considerably over time. Although free
personal care is the most expensive reform option in the
short term, changes in home ownership could make the
suggested reforms to means test of capital more expensive
in the long term. It follows that it might be ill-advised to
perform public policy by means of incremental changes,
since these are likely to be too concerned with present-day
issues. Conversely, a more far-reaching reform approach
might be better at handling the long-term issues.
A related issue is the finding by Karlsson et al. (2006) that
the long-term sustainability of different LTC systems varies
somewhat with the distribution of public costs for long-term
care. In a Japanese-style system, where a substantial part
of the public LTC costs are borne by the older half of the
population, contributions need not rise as much as in other
funding regimes. This could in turn be seen as an argument
for partly funded long-term care insurance, since such an
arrangement insulates the public funding from demographic
fluctuations. The case for funding of LTC might be stronger
than for pensions, since, firstly, the costs might be more
sensitive to demographic changes than pension costs, and
secondly, they constitute a smaller share of total public
expenditure and hence the transition would be less costly.
Thirdly, a distributional analysis needs to take the distri-
bution between men and women into account. Due to
systematic differences in earnings, assets, cohabitation
patterns, health, life expectancy and provision of informal
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Figure 4: Net present value of public LTC benefits, by
age
care, men and women are bound to fare very differently in
any funding regime, and this raises the issue as to whether
the differences are perceived as ‘fair’. Karlsson et al. (2006)
show that the funding regimes practiced in different coun-
tries differ significantly in this respect; for example,
changing to a Swedish-style system would increase average
redistribution from men to women by around £10,000 over
a life cycle. Interestingly, there seems to be no correlation
between informal caregiving patterns – where women typi-
cally provide more – and the redistribution in the formal
care system.
Most projection models are in effect extended population
projections, and as such they tend to disregard systematic
differences between different population strata. One reason,
however, why the empirical evidence on trends in morbid-
ity is so incomplete could be that different subgroups of the
population are diverging over time. Hence, models of
disability and LTC could benefit from allowing for more
heterogeneity within the population. Introducing such hetero-
geneity would be useful from several points of view.
Educational attainment, for example, is correlated with
health and morbidity as well as with savings and income
(and possibly also with preferences and behaviour). Thus,
projections could and should be done separately for differ-
ent educational groups – as well as for other subgroups of
the population.
Another serious limitation of previous models is that they
do not allow for behavioural responses. One example where
policy reform could induce behavioural change is the
popular suggestion of a tax on bequests (cf. Casey, 2003),
in which case there is a risk that intra-family transfers will
offset the tax at least partly. It is clear that incentives do
matter, as the UK experience demonstrates: changes in the
funding formula for residential care in the 1980s lead to a
rapid expansion of care homes which could not at all be
attributed to changes in demography or morbidity (cf. Howe
and Healy, 2005). In fact, the system for LTC funding and
benefits is likely to influence a wide range of decisions on
the part of the individual, such as
• the choice between informal and formal care (cf.
Pudney et al., 2006), and between domiciliary and
institutional care;
• the supply of informal care;
• labour market decisions – how much to work, how
long to work.
Given a lack of systematic studies, it is impossible to tell
how important these possible changes in behaviour are.
Incentives clearly matter if individuals behave rationally.
But do they? There are new developments in behavioural
finance which suggest that individuals are bad at handling
costly events which occur with a very low probability (cf.
Mitchell and Utkus, 2003). This is probably particularly true
for long term decisions as whether to make financial
arrangements for LTC or not. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that the low take-up of private long term care
insurance is perfectly rational in the presence of a means
tested public subsidy (Pauly, 1990). Further research should
investigate to what extent and under which circumstances
individuals can be expected to behave rationally in the face
of future LTC risk – which is a precondition for any analy-
sis of incentives and their effects. On the other hand, if
individuals do not behave rationally, it is equally important
to assess the implications of their misperceptions.
Finally, the macroeconomic assumptions of LTC models are
particularly naïve. LTC unit costs are normally assumed to
follow labour costs or the GDP per capita closely, and
sensitivity analysis is undertaken to see what happens when
LTC costs diverge in some direction. This approach is
probably reasonable given that LTC services are very labour
intensive and there is little potential for efficiency gains over
time. Historical data, however, suggest that LTC costs in
the UK have been growing at a slower pace than unit labour
costs – despite the surge in demand for these services
(Curtis and Netten, 2006). For the future, it could be argued
that shortage of labour and increases in demand would push
LTC costs upwards. On the other hand, trade liberalisation
is believed to have put a downward pressure on unskilled
worker’s wages in rich countries (Wood, 1995). Hence,
there is a considerable uncertainty regarding the future costs
of care, and a more comprehensive model of the economy
could provide some insights into this. Furthermore, to the
extent that the funding of LTC affects savings and labour
market behaviours, the funding formula will have reper-
cussions in the macro-economy which should be taken into
account. In summary, projections of LTC costs would
benefit from more explicit macroeconomic modelling.
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The paper analyses the history of English social care
philosophy, policy, and institutions since the late seven-
ties, and the challenges of today which they have helped
to shape. Guiding principles changed in fundamental ways
requiring and causing profound cultural and structural
changes, not always with the intended mix of conse-
quences. Changes in practice philosophy complemented
changes in the philosophical bases of policy. They moved
along a continuum of doing ‘to’ people (containing and
controlling as well as caring), to doing ‘for’ (paternalis-
tic but often also patronisingly assuming ‘cosiness’ in
looking after people), to doing ‘with’ (partnership and
participation), to offering more independence choice and
control and doing ‘by’ themselves but with ‘assistance’
when needed. Since 1989, policy and institutions have
been adapted to reduce the dependence on institutions,
better match responses to individual circumstances and
increase control and choice by shifting the balance of roles
of authorities from direct provision to planning and
purchasing more diverse services and supporting the devel-
opment of a succession of new models for securing their
fit to user wishes and circumstances. From 1998, policy
was designed to accelerate and secure greater consistency
in development based on the national policy principles
through performance management including rewards and
incentives. From 2005, the challenge was defined more
in terms of improving the broad wellbeing of older people
and finding new ways of contributing to it, particularly in
ways which would reduce the subsequent need for serv-
ices. Pressures on public budgets have throughout been
and continue to be a major concern of field agencies.
It continues to be topical and timely although it also contin-
ues to be addressed with a degree of timidity reflecting the
tensions it encapsulates. So, how should assistance be
provided for people as they age with an increasing likeli-
hood of detiorating physical and cognitive capacity and
with an increased potential for mental ill health, especially
depression (see, for example, National Centre for Social
Research, 2000)? With current and projected demography
showing an overall significant ageing of the population,
and with the balance across age groups skewing towards a
higher proportion of much older people, social policy and
social care practice has often adjusted itself to survive,
rather than to support and sustain, an ageing population.
Setting the changing scene
A long-term perspective shows a move away from institu-
tional care in the 1940s (in large geriatric hospitals and
mental health asylums, often having been reincarnated from
former Poor Law workhouses), to the advent of smaller resi-
dential care and nursing homes from the 1960s, and with
a greater emphasis on community care assisting people
within their own homes from the 1980s, to a current policy
to support people to live independently. The practice philos-
ophy running alongside the policy changes has seen a move
along a continuum of doing ‘to’ people (which was as much
about containment and control as about care), to doing ‘for’
(with its paternalistic but also often patronising ‘cosiness’
of looking after people), and then doing ‘with’ (in part-
nership and with participation by older people), to an
intention now that people should have more choice and
control and be ‘in charge’ doing ‘by’ themselves but with
‘assistance’ rather than ‘care’.
The change in practice philosophy is illustrated by
changing terminology. Government initiatives about
‘community care’ have been replaced by initiatives about
‘supporting people’ and ‘promoting independence’. But
as well as reflecting positive changes in philosophy, with
a movement away from segregation, institutional isola-
tion, containment and negative discrimination, many
older people experience benign neglect, with families
having fragmented, been reconstituted and geographically
more dispersed, and with the state rationing services
more heavily. 
There is also a two-tier experience of ageing. Those in
good health and those with cash and resources within their
own control (and they are likely to be the same people) have
longer lives and continuing opportunity, and when they
need assistance they can buy it (although its quality may
still be limited). These are the older people with signifi-
cant occupational pensions, available equity through home
ownership and inherited wealth from a previous generation,
all of which is increasing for the ‘new elderly’. But for older
people who need state support with income maintenance,
housing and the provision of social care assistance there are
more heavily rationed and reducing services, often
purchased by the state more cheaply and of a lower spec-
ification and quality, and with waiting lists and delays
before any help is provided. For some older people this
means very damaging, unnecessary and too long hospitals
admissions, with the risks of secondary infections, deteri-
orating muscle tone, and reducing confidence, capacity and
competence.
The danger of increased rationing of services, and a contin-
uing heavy dependence on institutional services, was noted
by the Audit Commission twenty years ago:
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At best, there seems to be a shift from one pattern of resi-
dential care based on hospitals to an alternative supported
in many cases by Supplementary Benefit
Payments – missing out the more flexible and cost-effec-
tive forms of community care altogether. At worse, the
shortfall in services will grow, with more vulnerable and
disabled people left without care and at serious personal
risk.
Audit Commission, 1986, p.2
The framework which has resulted is still overall one of
‘less eligibility’, a residue of the Poor Law, with bureau-
cratic procedures having been installed nationally to
determine who will not be assisted as much as who should
be helped. This is a residue which results from limitations
in resources leading to an emphasis on rationing. But it also
reflects the limited value which has been given to older
people, who have been seen as a drain and strain and a cost
for communities rather than as active participants and
contributing citizens (see Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister, 2006). 
This contrasts with some other cultures known to the author,
such as in The Gambia, where older people are seen to have
experience and wisdom and the elders have status as advi-
sors and decision-makers. It also contrasts with the very real
position in the UK where it is often older people who are
leading and sustaining community and voluntary organisa-
tions as well as being a resource as carers and confidants
within their own families and neighbourhoods.
Our concept of ‘being old’ is also changing. No longer, in
some respects, are women aged 60 and men aged 65 seen
as ‘elderly’. The age of admission to residential care is now
in the high 80s rather than the mid 70s, and more people
are maintaining active and independent lives well into their
90s. The special and unusual significance of reaching 100
is less now that more people are becoming centenarians.
Service performance measures which used to focus on how
many people aged over 65 years are receiving assistance
have been replaced over time by measures of over 75s and
then over 85s.
However, conversely, people aged 50 plus are being drawn
into the concept of ‘being elderly’ as, very positively, they
are encouraged to plan for their own ageing, and in partic-
ular about money, housing, health and activity. They are
also, more generally, being engaged in planning the shape
of future services, which is especially relevant as services
being commissioned and designed now, and especially where
they require a return on capital investment, are still likely
to be what is available in twenty or thirty years time. 
And the aspirations of someone who is now aged eighty,
who would have been born in the mid 1920s, and would
have grown up under the Poor Law, the depression of the
1930s and the post-war rationing in the late 1940s and early
1950s are likely to be quite different to someone who was
born in 1950 (and who will be aged eighty in 2030) with
an experience of the MacMillan ‘never had it so good’
1950s, with an adolescence in the freedom decade of the
1960s, and with much of their adulthood amidst the
consumerism and individualism of the Thatcher years, and
all within the framework of the post 1946/1948 welfare
state. 
The accepting, largely undemanding and grateful (see Help
the Aged, 2006) current older generation (who regularly rate
services as good or better) will be replaced by a consumer-
orientated, choice-expecting and quality-conscious
generation who are likely to be more demanding and less
acquiescent. For an increasing number they will have control
of their lives as they use their own wealth to determine how
they want to live. For a smaller number with no or limited
financial resources, they could be, and are being, left
stranded by a state which only sees the improvements within
a majority who are more visible than an isolated, excluded
and ghettoised minority.
Policy and practice: shaping or responding?
So, within this changing scenario of ageing and of older
people what has happened within social policy and social
care practice? To what extent has it shaped the context for
older people and to what extent has it responded to chang-
ing contexts? The answer, of course, is that it is both.
Policy and practice has an impact on experience and shapes
expectations, but it also is a creature of its times, reflect-
ing contemporary values and realities. And policy and
practice are often rational responses to current and future
issues, but there are also times when they generate their
own unanticipated and unintended consequences. One such
dynamic was a major driver in promoting the social care
changes of the 1980s.
The growth of residential care
In the late 1970s, despite the national community care
policy intention that more disabled and older people should
be assisted to remain in their homes, a possibility was
spotted of using the income support system to meet the
majority of people’s costs if they moved into residential or
nursing home care:
. . .in contrast to Attendance Allowance and Invalid Care
Allowance no test of disability is required for
Supplementary Benefits payment for board and lodging
unless the special rate for ‘very dependent elderly’ is
claimed. Thus, anybody fulfilling the Supplementary
Benefits rules (irrespective of extent of disability) who
chooses to live in a residential home is entitled to
allowances meeting their fees up to £125 or more a week
. . . in these circumstances the temptation must be strong
for anyone trying to look after a relative at home to make
use of the more generous, and far less stringent payments
for board and lodgings, by placing them in residential
care . . . in short, the more residential the care, the easier
it is to obtain benefits, and the greater the size of the
payment. And Supplementary Benefit funding cannot be
targeted towards those most in need of residential care.
Nor are homes judged on whether they are giving value
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for money within the care for which they are registered.
Audit Commission, 1986, p.44
This manoeuvre was not only followed up by disabled and
older people themselves as an alternative to waiting for
local authority funding to allow them to move to inde-
pendent private and voluntary sector care homes, but was
also encouraged (albeit often surreptiously) by local coun-
cils as a means at a time of tight budget restrictions to shunt
costs from local authorities to the Department for Social
Security:
Local authorities are becoming increasingly aware that
board and lodging payments can often meet the accom-
modation and care costs of those in independent homes
who might previously have been sponsored by the local
authority. In at least two of the authorities visited, a ‘gain’
of £1 million a year (each) had been received by trans-
ferring to Supplementary Benefits responsibility for people
placed in voluntary sector residential accommodation.
Audit Commission, 1986, p.45
The consequences were an escalation in the social security
spend on residential care from £10m in 1974 to £1bn by
1989 (Evandrou, Falkingham, and Glennester, 1991), the
move into residential care of older people for whom there
was (at least within local authority threshold judgements)
no need for residential care, and a burgeoning private sector
expansion of care homes, often run as small businesses. It
was not at all unusual to find, for example, a local builder
adapting properties to become care homes which were then
managed by his wife and staffed by other family members
or local doctors owning care and nursing homes. But at the
same time that this unintended consequence of social policy
(the opening up of the social security system to pay care
home fees) was taking place, another counter initiative was
being implemented.
Care management
The advent of ‘care management’ is a fascinating example
of how national policy can grow from local initiatives (a
further example below is about ‘direct payments’). Indeed
what is about to be illustrated here is how there is often a
time-lag between a successful and well promoted local
model and its adoption within national policy and legisla-
tion.
‘Care (or case) management’ in the UK was heavily
promoted in Kent, starting with the Kent Community
Care Project in Thanet in April 1976. Kent County
Council took up, shaped and promoted a model designed
at the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU)
at the University of Kent at the end of 1974. PSSRU
then evaluated its implementation and impact. In this
well-structured evaluative study of care management with
older people ( and one of those too rare occasions where
research can be seen to have influenced policy develop-
ment) it was found that care management led to lower
rates of admission to institutions, there were gains in
cost-efficiency, there was a closer match between
resources used and the needs of the older people, and
older people and their carers appeared to benefit more
from the (care management) scheme than from the usual
range of services, and “the reduction in admission to
institutional care did not appear to be achieved at the
expense of quality of life” (Challis and Davies, 1986).
Professionally and, especially, politically ‘care manage-
ment’ found its moment in time, although in its wider
roll-out some of the focus, professional social work skills
base and sophistication of the initial model were lost.
Professionally, the emphasis on care managers being beside
disabled and older people helping them to choose how they
wanted their needs to be met, and then making the arrange-
ments on behalf of the disabled or older person, fitted well
with a professional orientation focussed on assisting but not
controlling or dominating people. Politically, care manage-
ment fitted well with the Thatcherism philosophy of a mixed
economy of care which would alter the balance away from
a heavy reliance on local authority provided and managed
services, with the market to drive the three ‘Es’ of greater
economy, efficiency and effectiveness (but often forgetting
a concern for ‘equity’ and a fairness between people and
between areas), and where consumer choice would drive
the re-shaping of services and promote quality.
Griffiths and the reform of community care
This was all then picked up by Sir Roy Griffiths in his report
on the care of disabled and older people, with Griffiths
noting the gap between policy rhetoric and reality:
At the centre, community care has been talked of for
thirty years and in few areas can the gap between politi-
cal rhetoric and policy on the other hand have been so
great. To talk of policy in matters of care except in the
context of available resources and timescales for action
owes more to theology than to the purposeful delivery of
a caring service.
Griffiths, 1988, p.iv
Griffiths noted the perverse incentive resulting from social
security payments being available to fund a person’s resi-
dential care but not their care at home, and saw the solution
as making local authorities responsible for assessing whether
someone needed residential care and what was a reasonable
rate to pay for that care. But Griffiths also saw that giving
local authorities this responsibility, and the control of the
money for care services, would allow the ambitions of
national policy care for more people in their own homes to
be more easily attained:
The aim would be first, to preserve entitlements whilst
putting the social services authority in a position of finan-
cial neutrality in deciding what form of care would be in
the best interest of the individual and secondly to ensure
that individuals are not placed in residential accommoda-
tion, when it is not in their best interest.
Griffiths, 1988, p. vii
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The actions proposed in the Griffiths Report were that local
councils should assess the community care needs of their
area, set priorities and service plans, assess individual needs
within this framework “taking full account of personal pref-
erences” and “design packages of care best suited to
enabling the consumer to live as normal a life as possible”,
and then to arrange the delivery of the package of care,
acting as “the designers, organisers and purchasers of non-
health services, and not primarily as direct providers”.
At the time Griffiths was not totally ‘on message’ politi-
cally (see Baldock,1994; Jones, 1994). Thatcher was uneasy
about handing more money over to the control of local
government whereas Griffiths’ view was that “to prescribe
from the centre will be to shrivel the varied pattern of local
activity”. But Griffiths did argue that there needed to be
stronger national incentives and sanctions noting that
“nothing could be more radical in the public sector than to
spell out responsibilities, insist on performance and account-
ability and to evidence what action is being taken”. This is
a message which was heard and then reflected in the
increased management from the political centre introduced
by New Labour in the late 1990s. Griffiths also went on to
say that it would be “even more radical to match policy
with appropriate resources and agreed timescales”, but even
now twenty years on this can be seen to be a message
which has still to be heard and continues to be debated, espe-
cially in terms of how much should people pay towards their
own care (Royal Commission, 1999; Wanless and Forder,
2006).
It was by and large the recommendations of the Griffiths
Report which were picked up in the 1990 NHS and
Community Care Act (see also Department of Health,
1990). This legislation, which followed the ‘Caring for
People’(1989) white paper, gave the framework within
which local authorities were to assume the responsibility for
public funding of residential and nursing home care, with
the government to transfer to local authorities during a
transitional period of several years the social security spend
which had seeped into funding care services. But through
this manoeuvre the Government also intended to cap the
public spend on care services (with social security spend
being uncapped and rights-based whereas local authority
budgets are cash-limited and discretionary), and to re-direct
expenditure away from residential services to more invest-
ment to assist people in their own homes and in their own
communities. How the government came to create further
levers to promote and deliver this change is discussed below.
The Griffiths Report and the ‘Caring for People’ white
paper also resulted in a flurry of reorganisation within local
authority social services departments, with new organisa-
tional arrangements being established to separate care
management and the purchasing of services from the provi-
sion and management of direct care services. There was also
the requirement that “local authorities should set up inde-
pendent inspection units, under the Director of Social
Services, charged with inspecting and reporting on both
local authority and registerable independent residential care
homes” to ensure that “common standards should apply
across all sectors” (Caring for People, 1989). This inspec-
tion and regulation function was further expanded and
shaped in the mid 1990s and with the inspection and regu-
lation functions being taken outside of local councils to an
independent inspectorate (see Burgner, 1996).
There was also a flurry of activity to create specialists and
separate divisions within social services departments for
the management of children’s services discrete from the
management of social care services for disabled and older
adults, and this partly reflected the increasingly separating
legal frameworks for children’s services, through the 1989
Children Act and also the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, and
for adult and disability services, through the 1990 NHS and
Community Care Act. This is a separation which has now
reached its conclusion in the mid 2000s with the require-
ment in England (but not in the three other UK
administrations) that there be directors of children’s serv-
ices separate from directors of adult social services (see
Department of Health, 2005b) whereas previously every
local authority with social services responsibilities had to
have in post a director of social services. My own senior
management career between 1987 and 2006 mirrors these
changes where I went from being a divisional director of
social services, to deputy director of social services, to
senior assistant director (purchasing), to director of social
services and then to director of adult and community serv-
ices, and en route also had a year as chief executive setting
up one of the new national organisations spawned in the
early 2000s to promote the performance agenda.
The consequence of the community care changes heralded
by the Griffiths Report, shaped by the ‘Caring for People’
white paper and encapsulated in the 1990 NHS and
Community Care and the associated statutory regulations and
guidance (see, for example, Caring for People, 1990) was
that there was a levelling off and then a reduction in the
numbers of older people moving into residential and nursing
homes, and an increasing number of older people who were
assisted, primarily through receiving home care services
(see, for example, Audit Commission, 1996) but also day
care, respite care and home meals services, to live in their
own or family homes and this followed an existing trend:
There has been a gradual shift away in the balance of care
from hospitals to the community. The numbers of people
in long stay hospitals (whether elderly, mentally ill or
disabled in some way) have been declining with the
community expected to take the strain. People are
discharged earlier from acute hospitals with average stays
in geriatric beds halving over ten years. And with the
increase in day treatments they may no longer even stay
overnight. There are increasing demands for alternative
options from childbirth to hospice at home; and many
conditions such as asthma and diabetes are managed in the
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The most up-to-date picture of the re-patterning of commu-
nity care services, which it was noted in 2004-2005 were
provided to 1.7 million adults in England, is within the
annual report of the Commission for Social Care Inspection
which commented that:
There have been further increases in the number and
proportion of people using intensive home care (house-
holds using more than 10 contact hours and 6 or more
visits per week); in 2005, 98,240 households received
intensive home care (an increase of 6% from 2004) .
Admissions to nursing and care homes have continued
to decline reflecting government policy to support more
people to live independently in their own homes. The
number of people supported by councils to live in resi-
dential care decreased from 277,950 in 2003-04, to
267,240 in 2004-05.
Commission for Social Care Inspection, 2006
In essence, the changes reflected the community care policy
intentions and the Association of Directors of Social Services
commented one year after the implementation of the commu-
nity care changes that:
It is clear that Social Services have delivered the objec-
tives set for them in this first year. Assessment processes
have been established, negotiations undertaken with the
National Health Service, and arrangements made with the
independent sector which – with very few exceptions –
have proved to be effective and have considerably
improved the pre-1993 situation.
ADSS, 1994
However, this 1994 ADSS report (with a foreword by
Denise Platt, the then president of ADSS but later to become
the chief inspector for social services in the Department of
Health) also flagged up concerns about the uncertainty of
roles and responsibilities across the NHS/ Social Services
interface, the ‘planning blight’ resulting from the uncer-
tainties of local government reorganization, the lack of
clarity for engaging with housing authorities and providers
and, in particular, about the resources which would be
required to continue to successfully implement the commu-
nity care reforms.
This concern about resources was emphasized in a number
of reports at and around the time of the early 1990s commu-
nity care reforms and was seen as a major threat to achieving
the aspirations of the reforms:
The rate of growth allowed to social services by the
government between 1978/79 and 1988/89 was 22.3% in
real terms – an average annual increase of 2.3%,which is
intended to allow for ‘demographic and other changes’ . . .
Local authorities have been spending considerably more
on social services than the figure the government thought
necessary. Overall, their spending exceeded the govern-
ment’s figure by 4.3% in 1987/88, rising to 13.9% in
1990/91. The difference was made up from local taxation.
However, charge-capping has now forced spending down
and more into line with government figures . . . In 1990/91,
thirty two local authorities had reduced budgets for social
services, and many more had standstill budgets or reduced
growth. This year the trend is even sharper, with half of
all local authorities having reduced or standstill budgets
to bring them closer to government figures. Government
controls on local authority spending mean that the option
of raising more money locally is no longer viable.
Harding, 1992
This scenario is echoed in a further report five years later:
Funding was transferred (from the social security budget
to local authorities) in the form of a Special Transitional
Grant (STG) which has increased Government funding on
social services by 63% over the five years from 1992/93
to 1997/98. During this same period the basic Standard
Spending Assessment (the amount the government thinks
needs to be spent and on which it bases its formulae for
giving money to local councils), without any additions for
the STG, increased by only 8.5% in cash terms. Taking
inflation into account, the basic amounts of Personal Social
Services SSA have actually decreased by over six per cent
in real terms . . . A number of authorities have introduced
stringent limits on the number of placements they will
make and the services they will provide. These have been
introduced as emergency measures in response to budget
shortfalls. A result is users waiting in hospital beds for
placements which, due to their greater costs in compari-
son to residential care or nursing home beds, is not a cost
effective use of resources. Such a policy also has impli-
cations for the choices available to users.
Edwards ands Kenny, 1997
This financial scenario could be seen as another example
of an unanticipated effect of policy (this time the trickle
policy effect following the introduction of the “poll tax”,
which was so unpopular that it became an overriding
government concern, regardless of other social costs, to
keep it low with minimal yearly increases), and it was a
continuing concern four years later when the Audit
Commission (1996) noted that in 1995/96 local councils
were still spending on average 7% more on social services
than the national government considered appropriate and
that:
Overall, most authorities have given priority to commu-
nity care with steadily increasing sums made available to
deal with increased responsibilities. But whatever the
framework set by central government or the budgets set
by local government, financial commitments must be kept
within these budgets. This calls for a number of measures
starting with the careful management of the numbers
receiving care.
Audit Commission, 1996
From provision to planning and purchasing
A further government policy intention at this time was to
discourage local authorities from being direct providers of
services. For residential care for older people there was a
danger that by transferring the social security spend on
care into local social services budgets that local councils
would then use this money to spend on their own in-house
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care homes. This national government unwanted policy
outcome was avoided by restricting local authority capital
expenditure on building and maintaining care homes, by still
making available through the national social security system
a ‘residential care allowance’ which could only be claimed
by disabled and older people on low incomes who moved
in to independent private and voluntary sector care homes
(but not local authority homes), and through the ‘choice
directive’, which was a statutory regulation enshrining the
right of a person to choose which care home they entered
(albeit if funded by the local authority within a price enve-
lope set by the local council). 
Local councils (see Edwards and Kenny, 1997) indeed
increasingly transferred their existing care homes to the
independent sectors (and often spawned local not-for-profit
organisations, what might now be called ‘social enterprises’,
to take on the care homes) as a means of being able to attain
for the homes the capital investment they required. This was
not only to cover general maintenance and refurbishment
costs but also to meet the enhance standards now being set
nationally before a home could be registered and operated.
By transferring the homes local authorities also reduced their
net revenue commitment to the homes as residents with
limited income could claim the ‘residential care allowance’
to subsidise the costs of their placements and there was also
an opportunity for increased cross-subsidy from full fee
payers (who received no state support) as the fabric and
environment of the homes was enhanced making the homes
more attractive to self-funders. The new providers of the
former local authority homes also reduced the unit costs of
running the homes by reducing terms and conditions of
employment (and especially pension entitlement) and
management and staffing structures, and by focussed
management often leading to higher occupancy rates and
fewer voids (i.e. vacant beds).
At the same time, within the established independent care
home sector there was considerable turbulence. The new
registration standards (influenced by Avebury, 1984 and
which continued to be enhanced; see Department of Health,
2000) meant the closure of some previously adapted small
care homes, rising property prices meant it was possible in
many areas for care home owners to cash in on a capital
gain by selling the home (for conversion into apartments,
private dwellings or guest houses and hotels), and the unit
costs of, in particular, smaller care homes were higher than
the weekly fee rates local authorities were willing or able
to pay making the homes unviable, especially as the expand-
ing flow of potential residents was curtailed by the shift to
assisting more older people to remain, with support, in
their own homes. 
A consequence of all of this was a re-shaping of the care
home market, which has become much more dominated by
a smaller number of large national and international compa-
nies (which are often traded on) running larger homes.
Whether this market-driven re-shaping will meet the expec-
tations of the forthcoming generation of older people is
still to be seen as 80-100 place care homes are bound to
be somewhat institutional.
An alternative has been, especially within the private sector,
the growth of supported accommodation, through ‘retire-
ment apartments’ and indeed ‘retirement villages’, where a
whole range of activities and care is provided on-site to be
bought off a menu of options as and when needed. At the
same time, however, much 1960s and 1970s built local
authority ‘sheltered accommodation’ for older people has
become dated and poorly maintained and is difficult to let.
But overall the 1990s community care changes achieved the
government’s aspirations, which were largely shared by
older people, social care workers and local councils, to
stem the public spend on residential and nursing home care,
to repattern services to support more disabled and older
people within their own homes, to turn the focus of local
authorities to strategic planning, commissioning and service
purchasing rather than the direct management of service
provision, and to stimulate choice for service users within
a mixed economy of services. However, for those requir-
ing public funding for their services their choice was
increasingly limited by tight local authority budgets, which
led to a heightening in the thresholds of need which had to
be met before local authorities would fund a service.
This is a concern which is very current. The Commission
for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) has noted that fifteen
years ago councils provided home care to over 500,000
households (with each household on average having just over
three hours of home care a week). Despite the growing and
ageing population, and the policy of assisting more older
people to live within their own homes, only 395,000 house-
holds were receiving a local authority funded home care
service (albeit with an average of 10.1 hours per week) in
2004-2005. Some people may now be using their own
resources to buy the services they want without seeking help
from the local authority, but CSCI comments:
The continued increased intensity suggests that provision
is actually focusing on people with the greatest need,
providing a narrow range of people with a deep level of
service. Whilst this is important, it poses questions about
what happens to those people with considerable needs and
those who may be prevented or delayed from seeking
more expensive services by some timely, simple help.
Commission for Social Care Inspection, 2006
Direct payments and choice and control
For younger disabled people in particular, however, being
a recipient of what were still local authority determined and
arranged services was experienced as restrictive, limiting
and intrusive. This was especially so when local authori-
ties, especially as they continued to ration services heavily,
continued to spend most of their social care budgets on resi-
dential care leaving limited choice for people with
impairments with the options of little or no service or resi-
dential care. The residential care itself was experienced as
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engulfing, leaving little space for individual life-style deci-
sion making, little privacy and little opportunity for any
personal progress or change in the future.
It was disabled people themselves (see Morris, 1993;
Campbell and Oliver, 1996; Oliver and Barnes, 1998;
Barnes and Mercer, 2004)) who developed and led the
move towards more independent living in the community,
with the disabled person in charge of the resources to
acquire whatever assistance they needed when and how
they wanted it. The then existing social care legislation did
not give powers to local authorities to hand over money to
disabled people so that they could purchase their own serv-
ices (although social security disability benefits, such as
attendance and mobility allowances, did to some extent
provide this opportunity). Griffiths (1987) only dipped a toe
into the water of direct cash payments suggesting that “there
is no reason why, on a controlled basis, social services
authorities should not experiment with vouchers or credits
for particular levels of community care, allowing individ-
uals to spend them on particular forms of domiciliary care
and to choose between particular suppliers as they wish”. 
But Griffiths was in danger of being behind the times.
Local authorities were already using vouchers, for example,
so that parents of disabled children could arrange respite
care as, when and how they wanted and there was already
pressure from disabled people themselves, first in
Hampshire but then in a relatively small number of other
areas, for disabled people to have control of the cash for
the assistance they needed. Some local councils set up ‘third
party’ schemes where a grant would be given to a another,
often voluntary sector, organisation that would then, usually
following still a care management assessment, make cash
payments to the disabled person so that they could purchase
and have more control over the assistance they needed.
The popularity of these ‘indirect, third party’ payments was
such that, with considerable canvassing from organisations
of disabled people, but also with support from organisations
such as the Association of Directors of Social Services, the
government moved to introduce legislation, the 1996
Community Care (Direct Payments) Act.
The 1996 Act gave the power, although not initially the
duty, to local authorities to give direct cash payments to
disabled people who were “willing and able” to arrange and
manage the assistance they required. At first this was limited
to disabled adults aged between 18-64 years, but was then
extended to all disabled adults aged over 18, including older
people, to 16-17 year old disabled young people making the
transition to adulthood and to carers. This was a win-win-
win policy, supporting the aspirations of many disabled
people to have more control within their lives, supporting
the then Major government’s interest in moving services
away from local authority control (as also happened, for
example, with schools becoming grant maintained rather
than immediately managed by local education authorities),
and the incoming New Labour government’s agenda to
promote consumer choice as a means of pushing forward
improvements in services and to break what was seen as
the lethargy of the public sector and the paralysis of public
sector bureaucracies.
However, the take up of direct payments was slow (see
Commission for Social Care Inspection, 2004), partly
because local authorities may not have heavily promoted
them (and some where openly opposed to direct payments
which might threaten the viability of in-house services, a
concern also shared by public sector unions) and partly
because, as now, there are limited numbers of disabled and
older people and carers who want to take on the responsi-
bility, pressure, tensions and workload of making their own
service arrangements. One way around this conundrum of
increased choice and control being set against increased
stress and work is the introduction in the mid 2000s of ‘indi-
vidual budgets’ where a sum of money is allocated to the
service user, they can choose how it is spent, but the
management of the money and the arranging of services may
be undertaken by someone within the local authority, usually
a social worker, or by a third party, such as a family,
friend or advocate. But the take-up of direct payments is
increasing from 14,000 people in March 2004 to 22,000
people in March 2005 to 32,000 in March 2006
(Commission for Social Care Inspection, 2006). No doubt
this increase is prompted by local authorities having ‘direct
payments’ as one of the key performance indicators on
which they are externally measured and publicly assessed,
but it also reflects a continuing change in professional and
agency culture, confidence and competence in promoting
direct payments. 
Promoting performance
By the end of the 1990s, however, despite the community
care framework from 1990 having been in place for ten
years there were concerns about the limited pace of change
and an expressed frustration by the in-a-hurry new Labour
government from 1997 to want to make a difference and to
be seen to be making a difference. In particular, Blair had
a concern about the inertia within public services (see
Sampson, 2004; Seldon, 2005). A new, and not seen before,
phase of public policy was initiated. Right across the public
sector there was a government crusade focussed on perform-
ance and quality and a number of levers were constructed
to drive performance and quality improvements (see
O’Neill, 2002). Similar techniques to drive change were
applied in widely varying public services from health to
education to housing to libraries to waste management, etc.
and social care for disabled and older people experienced
the full range of levers within this somewhat manic and
certainly managerial agenda from central government.
The levers for change (Jones, 2004) included:
• “management by machismo”, achieving an impact
through threat and intimidation (more prevalent in
recent years in the NHS than social care), including
being publicly “named and shamed” and “called in” to
48
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
see the chief inspector with jobs on the line;
• “management by message”, with the clusters of
performance indicators showing where the government
wants attention to be given and within national policy
frameworks, such as the National Service Framework
for Older People (Department of Health, 2001);
• “management by measurement”, on the basis of what
gets measured gets done!
• “management by motivation”, with rewards (stars and
honours) for achievements and punishment (more
inspections or on monthly report) for failures;
• “management by money”, with specific grants from
central government defining how resources can be used;
• “management by mistake”, which is to be avoided
where possible but where there is an unintended
consequence of striving to hit a target and with this
undermining sensible policy (as with local authorities
being measured on how much service they provide or
purchase but not how much they invest in building
community capacity to enhance life opportunities and
experience more generally for older people).
The pulling of these levers had an impact. On the basis of
what gets measured gets given attention, and that punish-
ment will almost always be avoided and rewards will be
chased, the performance targets set by central government
did demonstrably lead to “gradual improvement and the
modernisation of services” (CSCI, 2006, p.iii). Those
people still seen as eligible for help received that help more
quickly, the help provided was repatterned in line with
national policy intentions (such as more home care and
more community equipment to assist people to remain at
home), and the views of samples of service users were
sought each year to check on consumer satisfaction, which
started relatively high and continued at similar levels but
with quite considerable variation between local authorities.
But the focus on performance indicators which were largely
agency and service focussed has its own limitations. Firstly,
the indicators did not encourage the integration of services
between, for example, health and social services, despite
evidence that bringing health and social care together locally
can improve access to, and speed of response of, services
(see Brown, Tucker, and Domokos, 2002). Each public
service sector had its own battery of indicators, focussed
inwardly on its performance rating, and when the going got
tough (especially about funding) would look after its own
interests even if at the expense of its partners. This has been
an intense experience in those areas where the NHS had
set itself an unrealistic and damaging timetable to achieve
financial balance after years of overspending. Secondly,
for disabled and older people their quality of life is not only
determined by the quality and quantity of services they
receive. The services remain important but the service-
focus misses the whole life-focus which is of importance
to disabled and older people. The service focus primarily
sees older people as service users and recipients of assis-
tance, but not as active and contributing citizens with often
unique aspirations.
The bigger and broader picture
It is this bigger and broader picture for disabled and older
people which has most recently been painted by the govern-
ment (see Department of Work and Pensions, 2005; Office
of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2006), prompted by organ-
isations for disabled people (see Help the Aged, 2004) and
service and professional organisations (see LGA, 2004). It
takes into account that older people, for example, are still
citizens who within their communities are impacted by
universal commercial and public services as well as special-
ist and secondary health and social care services. It also
recognises that older people do not primarily define them-
selves in terms of the services they receive but still have a
range of roles, and make a range of contributions, within
their continuing capacity and commitment and reflecting
their continuing ambitions and aspirations. For the public
sector, therefore, a perspective is needed which sees older
people more roundly in a bigger context which is not restric-
tively defined only in terms of services. 
Focussing on this wider context can be a potential ally in
seeking to address some of the difficulties heavily rationed
public services have failed to adequately tackle. For
example, high levels of depression in older people who use
social care services (see, for example, Brown, Tucker, and
Domokos, 2002) may be linked to a narrowing of friend-
ship networks, to bereavement and loss of close family and
friends, but also to some loss of capacity and physical and
intellectual functioning. Opportunities for older people to
remain socially active and engaged within their communi-
ties, with valued roles and status, and with social and
intellectual stimulation, may contribute more to tackling
depression than the array of health and social care services.
It may also encourage continued physical activity, delay-
ing or minimising the onset of physical deterioration and
ill health.
It is local authorities (see, for example, DTLR, 2001) who
have been given by central government a lead responsibil-
ity, through ‘local area agreements’ and ‘local public service
agreements’, to bring together the sectors and interest groups
right across communities to look to enhance the life expe-
rience and opportunities for everyone within the community.
This might range from tackling crime and nuisance and the
fear of crime, to the availability and access to transport,
leisure and retail services, to safe and attractive environ-
ments with reasonable and appropriate housing, and with
encouragement for communities to actively engage with all
their citizens.
For agencies that have traditionally been service providers
or, more recently service purchasers, they need to have a
focus on community development as much as service devel-
opment. This was a theme in the Seebohm Report (1968)
on social services in England in the late 1960s, and twenty
years on it was a part of the script for care managers and
their organisations in the Griffiths Report in 1988 in devel-
oping more options to give more choice to disabled and
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older people, and twenty years on again it has re-emerged
as a major theme in social policy for older people.
Where now?
Chronology may influence but does not define or determine
people and their needs. Being aged 75 does not require that
someone must be in ill health and needing a range of health
and social care services. Social care and health services are
not provided to older people because of their age but because
of their variable, but likely to be increasing, needs. And
the experience of being aged 75 is not solely or, for most
people, even primarily described and delimited by their
health or social care status. This is the current challenge
about the change in mind set which is required if people as
they age are to be seen as more than dependent, and despon-
dent, recipients of services.
There is also a challenge to move further away from the
legacy of the Poor Law, with a Poor Law residue in our
current policies which are focussed on determining who is
not entitled to assistance (what was called under the Poor
Law ‘less eligibility’), with a continuing dependence on
segregation in institutions (care homes), and with the ‘parish
rate’ still alive and well through the council tax and terri-
torial differences between local authorities in access to and
standards of service and with disabled and older people
having to be re-assessed when they cross local authority (the
new ‘parish’) boundaries.
An alternative would be, firstly, to move to a rights-based
rather than discretion-based system of social care entitle-
ment, maybe with disabled and older people receiving
funding direct from national social security disability and
income support benefits. This would, at a sweep, do away
with the need for ‘direct payments’ and ‘individual budgets’,
but would still require a framework of care arrangers,
brokers or, as they were called in the Adult Social Care
Green Paper (Department of Health, 2005a), ‘care naviga-
tors’ who would assist the disabled or older person to access
and arrange the assistance they might need and want.
A second alternative would be to move towards enhanc-
ing the whole-life experience of disabled and older
people, with universal services provided by all the
sectors, including for example retail, transport and
recreation, being more geared to the needs of disabled
and older people (as is already happening to some extent
with home-shopping services), and with more opportuni-
ties for disabled and older people to continue as active
contributing and participating citizens. This would be a
move away from a focus on services to a focus on expe-
rience, which is how strategic planners and
commissioners ought to re-frame their attention.
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
References
ADSS (1994) Towards Community Care: ADSS Review of the First
Year. London: Association of Directors of Social Services.
Audit Commission (1986) Making A Reality of Community Care.
London: London: Audit Commission.
Audit Commission (1992) Community Care: Managing the Cascade
of Change. London: Audit Commission.
Audit Commission (1996) Balancing the Care Equation: Progress
with Community Care. Community Care Bulletin No. 3, March
1996.
Avebury Report (1984) Home Life: A Code of Practice for
Residential Care. London: Centre for Policy on Ageing.
Baldock, J. (1994) The Personal Social Services: The Politics of
Care. In: George, V. and Miller, M. (eds.) Social Policy
Towards 2000: Squaring the Welfare Circle. London: Routledge.
Barnes, C. and Mercer, G. (2004) Implementing the Social Model
of Disability: Theory and Research. Leeds: The Disability Press.
Brown, L., Tucker, C. and Domokos, T. (2002) The Impact of
Integrated Health and Social Care Teams for Older People
Living in the Community. University of Bath.
Burgner, T. (1996) The Regulation and Inspection of Social
Services. Department of Health and the Welsh Office.
Campbell, J. and Oliver, M. (1996) Disability Politics. London:
Routledge.
Caring for People: Community Care in the Next Decade and
Beyond (1989) Cmnd 849. London: HMSO.
Caring for People: Community Care in the Next decade and
Beyond: Policy Guidance (1990). London: HMSO.
Challis, D. and Davies, B. (1986) Case Management in Community
Care: An Evaluated Experiment in the Home Care of the Elderly.
Aldershot: Gower.
Commission for Social Care Inspection (2004) Direct Payments:
What are the Barriers? London: CSCI.
Commission for Social Care Inspection (2006) The State of Social 
Care in England 2005-06. London: CSCI.
Community Care (Direct Payments) Act (1996) London: HMSO.
Department of Health (1990) National Health Service and
Community Care Act 1990: A Brief Guide. London: Department
of Health.
Department of Health (2000) Care Homes for Older People:
National Minimum Standards: Care Home Regulations. London:
The Stationary Office.
Department of Health (2001) National Service Framework for Older
People. London: The Stationary Office.
Department of Health (2005a) Independence, Well-being and
Choice. London: The Stationary Office.
Department of Health (2005b) Guidance on the Role of the Director
of Adult Social Services. London: The Stationary Office.
Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions
(2001) Strong Local Leadership-Quality Public Services. London:
DTLR.
Department of Work and Pensions (2005) Opportunity Age:
Meeting the Challenges of Ageing in the 21st Century. London:
The Stationary Office.
Edwards, P. and Kenny, D. (1997) Community Care Trends 1997:
The Impact of Funding on Local Authorities. Local Government
Management Board.
Evandrou, M., Falkingham, J., and Glennester, H. (1991) The
Personal Social Services: Everyone’s Poor Relation but Nobody’s
Baby. In: Hills, J. (ed.) The State of Welfare. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Griffiths Report (1988) Community Care: Agenda for Action.
London: HMSO.
Harding, T. (1992) Great Expectations…and Spending on Social
Services. National Institute for Social Work.
Help the Aged (2004) Older People: Our Neglected Assets. Help
the Aged.
51
Help the Aged (2006) Necessities of Life: Older People’s
Experiences of Poverty. Help the Aged.
Jones, K. (1994) The Making of Social Policy in Britain 1830-
1990. London: The Athlone Press.
Jones, R. (2004) The Tables Turned: Taking the Pulse of Social
Care Inspection. ADSS Inform, October 2004, p.21. 
LGA (2004) Our Future in Our Hands: Putting People at the
Centre of Social Care. Local Government Association/
Association of Directors of Social Services/ NHS Confederation.
Morris, J. (1993) Independent Lives: Community Care and
Disabled People. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
National Centre for Social Research (2000) The Health of Older
People. Department of Health.
National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990) London:
HMSO.
O’Neill, O. (2002) A Question of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2006) A Sure Start to Later
Life: Ending Inequalities for Older People. London: The
Stationary Office.
Oliver, M. and Barnes, C. (1998) Disabled People and Social
Policy. London: Longman.
Royal Commission on Long Term Care for the Elderly (1999) With
respect to old age: long term care – rights and responsibilities.
London: The Stationary Office. 
Sampson, A. (2004) Who Runs This Place? The New Anatomy of
Britain in the 21st Century. London: John Murray.
Seebohm Report (1968) Report of the Committee on Local Authority
and Allied Personal Social Services. Cmnd 3703. London:
HMSO
Seldon, A. (2005) Blair. London: Free Press.
Wanless, D. et al. (2006) Securing Good Care for Older People:
Taking a Long Term View. London: King’s Fund.
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
Note on the Author
Professor Ray Jones was Director of Social Services, and then
Director of Adult and Community Services, with Wiltshire County
Council. He has also been Chief Executive of the Social Care
Institute for Excellence and Chair of the British Association of
Social Workers. He is a Visiting Professor at the University of
Bath (and formerly at the University of Exeter) and is an Honorary
Fellow of the University of Gloucestershire. He is also Chair of the








• Family caregiving and informal care
• Migrant careworkers
• The need for care and dementia
• Policy for formal care services
Ageing Horizons Brief
From this issue onwards, Ageing Horizons starts publish-
ing an online data brief. It presents key facts and figures
on the themes selected for each issue. Please visit
www.ageing.ox.ac.uk/pb to download our data brief on
long-term care in the PDF format.
Forthcoming issue – Fertility Decline
Online resources
The Ageing Horizons website www.ageing.ox.ac.uk/ageinghorizons has a large selection of additional material relevant
to the theme of the current issue.  This includes a selection of recent reports and articles on various aspects of long-term
care: 
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